Refugees as planners : Palestinian refugees in Jordan and UNRWA, 1950-1957 by Maraqa, Hania Nabil
Refugees as Planners:
Palestinian Refugees in Jordan and UNRWA, 1950-1957
Hania Nabil Maraqa
B. Sc. Architecture
University of Jordan, 2000
Master of Architecture
University of Arizona, 2004
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF URBAN STUDIES AND PLANNING IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
MASTER IN CITY PLANNING
AT THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
JUNE 2006
@ 2006, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All Rights Reserved.
Signature of Author:
Department
Certified by:
Accepted by:
of Urban Studies and Planning
May 15 2006
Balakrishnan Rajagopal
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Thesis Advisor
.....CHUS)r-S IN
OF TECHNOLOGY
OCT 2 6 2006
LIBRARIES
Langley Keyes
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Chairman, MCP Committee
ARCHIVES
Refugees as Planners:
Palestinian Refugees in Jordan and UNRWA, 1950-1957
By
Hania Nabil Maraqa
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
In May 2006 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master in City
Planning
ABSTRACT
This research is an institutional ethnography that documents a case for planning from the
middle and planning from below. It looks at the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in Jordan between 1950 and
1957. UNRWA started its operations in 1950 with plans for economic development. By
1957 there had been a clear shift in the agency's mandate to human development. There
are many possible reasons for this shift, one of which is the refugees' involvement in the
planning process, which was carried out by thousands of refugees working with the
agency and performing simultaneously the role of the planner and that of the beneficiary.
Refugee staff members included top administration staff as well as street-level
bureaucrats. Other refugees participated also in the planning process through spontaneous
uprisings, forming local action groups, networking, and building alliances.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Despite the darkness of the Palestinian refugee problem during the 58 years of its
existence, this story is a positive and an optimistic one. Not only is it an optimistic
narrative for the millions of Palestinian refugees, but also for those who are believed to
have limited access to power and limited resources to help them shape their own density.
In 1948, an estimated 750,000 Palestinians fled to Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon,
Jordan, and Syria. Upon their arrival to the host countries, refugees were supported by
humanitarian organizations. In December, 1949, the United Nations General Assembly
created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East (UNRWA). The goal of creating UNRWA was to provide immediate and
diminishing relief services that would transform gradually into diminishing development
projects. It assumed that the need for the latter would shrink as the refugees were
absorbed by the economies of the host governments.
According to the agency, "Palestine refugees are persons whose normal place of
residence was Palestine between June, 1946 and May, 1948, who lost both their homes
and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict." In 1950, the
number of Palestinian refugees was recorded as 0.9 million and, in 2004, it was recorded
as 4.2 million. Today, there are 59 Palestinian refugee camps recognized by UNRWA in
the Middle East. In Jordan, the country of analysis, there are ten camps that accommodate
approximately 280,000 refugees.
As the Palestinian refugees are the largest and longest-suffering group of refugees
in the world, they should be looked upon as stakeholders in any Israeli-Palestinian final
settlement. Even in Jordan where most Palestinian refugees have been awarded Jordanian
citizenship, a Palestinian identity is still alive and active. In addition, Palestinian
refugees belong to a wider international phenomenon of "refugeeness" that is growing at
an alarming level. At the start of 2005, the number of people registered with the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees increased by 13% to 19.2 million from 17
million the previous year. Of these, 9.2 million are registered as refugees. These are all
reasons why the Palestinian refugee issue is significant for negotiators, decision-makers,
planners, and researchers.
UNRWA is a unique case study for examination for the sheer scope and scale of its
operations. First, UNRWA is a quasi-governmental agency that has been performing
daily executive operations of social, educational, and health services for more than five
decades. These operations are usually rendered by a nation-state to its citizens. UNRWA
is the largest transnational employer in the Middle East with total staff posts that exceed
26,000, almost all of whom are refugees. Second, UNRWA was created to carry out
temporary operations and was transformed during its 57 years into a large bureaucracy.
Yet it has been able to survive financially and administratively as an autonomous
organization from the UN.
This study could not be timelier given the major role that UNRWA might be
playing in Gaza after the Israeli withdrawal and in the light of the economic boycott
imposed on the Palestinian Authority by the United States and the European Union. Plans
for an extension of the UNRWA's mandate to help a possible Palestinian state had been
envisaged since the Oslo Peace Process (al-Husseini, 2000). An understanding of
possible scenarios for the role that UNRWA may undertake will fall short of
comprehending the reality unless a comprehensible historical perspective on the agency
and the refugees is gained. As important, an understanding of democracy in Palestine
requires appreciation for the ways through which Palestinian refugees have tried non-
violent ways to determine their own destiny.
Organization of the Study
In the first three chapters I offer a literature review, frame the research question and
hypothesis, and discuss the research methodology. I review literature that relates to the
Palestinian refugee as well as UNRWA and highlight the gaps in both fields of inquiry. I
then pose the research questions: why did the shift in UNRWA's mandate take place
between 1950 and 1957, and I offer a hypothesis that highlights the role of the refugees in
achieving such a change. My research methodology depends on oral history and textual
resources from United Nations documents and the Jordanian press.
In the fourth chapter I provide historical background about the Palestinian refugee
problem. I trace the historical involvement of the United Nations in the conflict in
Palestine and the transformation of the UN role from that of legislator to mediator during
the years 1947-1950. I also analyze the role undertaken by the Economic Survey Mission,
the image it created for UNRWA as an apolitical development agency, and the image that
it created for its target population.
In the fifth chapter I analyze UNRWA's constitutional origins and mandate. I then
survey chronologically the transformation in the mandate from reintegration projects to
education between 1950 and 1957.
The sixth chapter is an ethnographic narrative challenging the mythical construct of
UNRWA as an insulated, top-down planning agency that acts upon the its passive
subjects. I suggest that the barriers between UNRWA as a planning agency and the
refugees, as planned for, were weakened. By this, I propose that the refugees were
planners themselves by working inside the agency and by organizing themselves to take
certain actions towards the agency. I examine the circumstances for creating refugees as
planners and the strategies they adopted in the planning process.
I conclude by reiterating the findings of this positive story: the refugees had a vital
role in proposing and implementing the shift in UNRWA's institutional mandate. Many
of them were able to do so by performing the dual roles of the developer and the
beneficiary. This case should broaden our understanding of how institutional change and
development processes should or could be pursued. This is especially true when it comes
to multinational institutions hiring local staff members without necessarily appreciating
their unique and indirect input in the planning process, which is a two-way street.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter I discuss the trends in researching the Palestinian refugees and the
UNRWA. I also highlight gaps in researching these two areas of study, many of which I
hope to bridge in this research.
Literature on Palestinian Refugees:
There is a huge body of literature on Palestinian refugees. For very legitimate
reasons, most of these studies have focused on the refugees' legal and political status and
their Right of Return (Aruri 1972, Abu Sitta 2001, Takkenberg 1998). Rarely have
studies touched upon the socio-cultural or anthropological aspects of the refugees' life
with a few exceptions (Sayigh 1979, Peteet 1996, Farah 2000, Jaber 1998). Many studies
relied on narrow quantitative methodologies such as close-ended questionnaires and
surveys (FAFO 2002). On the other hand, we find that the lack of studies on the socio-
cultural aspects of the refugees reflects a lack of understanding of the refugees as a social
force that has an impact on political, legal, and economic definitions and processes, and
consequently on the decision-making process.
As argued by researchers from Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Moyen-
Orient Contemporain (CERMOC), there is a general tendency among researchers, aid
agencies, and development institutions to marginalize refugees as passive objects of
history rather than as actors in their own destiny despite the political and economic
hardships imposed on them (CERMOC 2000). Lack of understanding of history and
forces that have shaped it tends to keep it solely in the hands of those who are able to
write it, and not necessarily those who have participated in shaping it (Khalidi 1997).
In the mid-1960s, the Palestine Research Center and Institute for Palestine Studies
were founded in Beirut. Both had a role in bridging the gap in archiving the Palestinian
history until the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982. Khalidi argues that there has been "a
dearth of sound historical scholarship by Palestinians." Many non-Palestinians have
contributed to this scholarship, but most of them lacked the "intimate familiarity with the
indigenous sources, the individuals concerned, and the social and cultural context of
Palestinian politics" (Khalidi 1997).
There is also a chronological gap. A few studies look in detail into the refugees'
situation in 1950s (Plascov 1981, Schiff 1995, Buehrig 1971). On the other hand, most
studies on Palestinian refugees focus on pre-1948 or post-1967, with much emphasis
given to the refugees' conditions during the Oslo Peace Process in the early 1990s (Farah
2000). The emphasis on refugee issues during these times reflects a tendency towards
viewing history as a product of political elites and nation-states. The time frame of this
study (1950-1957) is rich despite the absence of formal Palestinian political parties at this
time. An historical perspective allows for a deeper interpretation of the present and wiser
planning for the future.
This study also fills a gap regarding Palestinian refugees in Jordan. A few studies
have been done about refugees in Jordan (Farah 2004). Most refugee studies have
focused on refugees in the Occupied Territories (Farah 2000) and Lebanon (Sayigh 1979,
Peteet 2006). Two major factors have limited research on refugees in Jordan, both
quantitatively and qualitatively. Refugees in Jordan were awarded Jordanian passports.
As a consequence, their living conditions compare favorably with the extremely poor
living conditions of refugees in other countries where refugees were not awarded
citizenship: Lebanon and Syria. In addition, there are many limitations imposed on
researching refugee issues in Jordan due to bureaucratic traditions and political concerns.
Equally important, most studies about Palestinian refugees have been conducted by
international research institutions, such as CERMOC and FAFO1, rather than by
independent researchers. Having a group of researchers from one institution conduct
various studies about the refugees creates a niche and a comparative advantage for the
institutions. However, it may also raise questions about the agenda of those conducting
the research. Researchers should be given credit for their ability to create a discourse.
However, the question poses itself: Whose discourse are they creating and whom are they
representing?
Literature on UNRWA
There is a relatively huge body of literature on UNRWA. Most studies about
UNRWA have focused on the agency's work in Gaza and the West Bank (Schiff 2000).
Much emphasis has been given to the agency's work during the Oslo Peace Process and
the second intifada. Most studies on UNRWA were conducted within a framework of
political theory (Schiff 1995, Buehrig 1971). Few studies have looked at the
organizational structure of UNRWA (El-Farhan 1979). Many studies on UNRWA take as
a point of departure criticism of UNRWA for its present status as "pro-Palestinian," an
"imperialist instrument," or as "an arm of the West." Many parties also accuse UNRWA
of creating a dependency syndrome among the refugees through its Relief and Social
Services programs (Marx 2004, Machmias 2004, Perlmutter 1971). Many studies touch
1 An independent Norwegian research foundation.
upon viewing UNRWA as an arm of the West and an organ of the UN, which was
involved in the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem (Schiff 1995, Farah 2000).
UNRWA also receives the largest percentage of its budget from the United States, the
major supporter of Israel through its foreign policy and aid. In many studies, the image of
UNRWA has been simplified to an abstract agency without significant history to learn
from. These studies fail to contextualize UNRWA and to undertake a more rigorous
examination of its dynamics with different stakeholders and the challenges it has
experienced.
Focusing on both UNRWA and the Palestinian refugees, I place this research in the
stream of studies rethinking the development approach (Ferguson 1994, Rajagopal 2003,
Escobar 1995, Apffel Marglin 1990). I analyze development as a discursive discourse. I
suggest that despite all the expertise devoted to UNRWA as a development project, the
developers might have marginalized the political and social realities on the ground. This
case is not unique for UNRWA. Fr6d6rique Apffel-Marglin and Stephen A. Marglin
argue that in the development discourse, cultural practices and beliefs have not been
recognized in the modernization process as a legitimate asset, despite their efficiency
(Apffel-Marglin and Marglin 1996).
Focusing on the role of the clients in an institution, I borrow from works in
institutional ethnography and public participation. I borrow from Lipsky who highlights
the imperative role of street-level bureaucrats in achieving an incremental change in their
institution (Lipsky 1980). In the planning literature, I borrow from John Friedmann in his
acknowledgement of social mobilization as a legitimate and credible form of planning
(Friedmann 1987).
However, I distinguish this study from others conducted about the bottom-up planning
process. I reiterate that this study is not about planning from below as much as planning
from the middle. This is a major difference that distinguishes this study from other
planning studies that usually give credit to the top-down approach, and occasionally to
the bottom-up approach, but rarely to planning from the middle.
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
Taking in consideration the gaps that I found in literature about refugees and
UNRWA, I choose to study the interaction between the Palestinian refugees and
UNRWA in Jordan (1950-1957). I question the mainstream historiography that
frequently gives credit for an institutional mandate to the political elites and top
administration, especially when researching an international institution (Rajagopal 2003).
This research explores the role of the refugees in the planning process, with a special
focus on UNRWA's staff member refugees themselves, who were the mediators between
the agency and the beneficiaries.
Research Questions
The General Assembly through Resolution 302 (IV) created UNRWA in December,
1949. The goal of establishing UNRWA was as follows:
(a) To carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works
programmes as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission;
(b) To consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures
to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief
and works projects is no longer available.
However, UNRWA's mandate has not followed the originally envisioned one of
temporary, large-scale economic development, but has undergone continuous
transformations. Fifty-six years after its creation, UNRWA is a major player in the
Middle East. It renders quasi-governmental daily services to 4.2 million Palestinian
refugees and is identified as the largest UN agency and the largest transnational employer
in the region. Of special importance for this study is the transformation from large
economic development projects in 1950 to human development by 1957. What caused
the transformation in UNRWA's mandate between 1950 and 1957? What was the role of
the refugees, and especially refugees working with the agency, in this transformation?
And what allowed them to undertake such a role?
Hypothesis
UNRWA stands out as a bold example to deepen our understanding for ways in
which people can actively and substantially participate in development projects and
institutional mandates that directly affect their lives. The study suggests that UNRWA's
mandate was not exclusively shaped by its top administration or political elites, but also
by refugees themselves. The study suggests three groups of refugee planners: top-
administrative staff members in UNRWA, street level-bureaucrats in UNRWA, and
community planners. The dual roles that UNRWA staff members who were refugees
played as developers and as beneficiaries is of paramount importance in this case study.
The hypothesis suggests broadening the definition of development to accommodate the
important role of local staff members as well as the beneficiaries and to allow for synergy
between them and the formal institutions. This synergy is usually not acknowledged in
the mainstream discourse.
By looking at circumstances under which UNRWA was created and operated in
Jordan between 1950 and 1957, the research examines the diversity within the body of
the Palestinian refugees and challenges the mythical construct of Palestinian refugees as
a homogenous body of passive clients.
Research Methodology
I take an institutional ethnographic point of departure by relying on oral history and
textual resources.
First, I rely on oral history documented through semi-structured, open-ended
interviews conducted in Amman during the summer of 2005 with 35 former UNRWA
local staff members and refugee notables who witnessed the formation and
transformation of UNRWA between 1950 and 19572. Former UNRWA local staff
members among the interviewees included senior administrative staff members as well as
street-level bureaucrats. They are in their late 70s or early 80s and retired in the late
1980s or early 1990s. All of these interviewees were identified as Palestinian refugees,
according to UNRWA's definition and received UNRWA rations. Eighty percent of the
interviewees came from rural areas, and thirty percent were senior staff members in
social services or education. The sample is a snowball one and refugees were identified
one at a time mainly by other interviewees, by social networks, site visits to the camps, or
press releases and literature. The phone book was the tool used to get their contact
information. Interviews were conducted at their houses and were open-ended
questionnaires depending on the interviewee and his attitude. To obtain honest responses
from individuals, I have protected the anonymity of all interviewees.
The sample selection process was a result of many circumstances. First, UNRWA's
archives were not accessible to grant me a list of the former staff members and their
contact information, while other refugee notables do not have institutional affiliation to
2 Names of interviewees have been kept anonymous.
help me identify them. Second, the social landscape has changed. Many UNRWA staff
members have passed away or no longer live in Jordan. Third, international staff
members could not be located. They were already older at the time of their service and
those who have been identified have passed away. Fourth, the sample represents a gender
bias, as only one woman was interviewed. However, the sample reflects the limited role
that women officially played at UNRWA at the time. Press releases do not mention
names for women working on administrative jobs, but only those of nurses and teachers.
This does not mean that women were not active, but it means that their role might have
been indirect or unrecognized. Many interviewees had their wives sitting in on the
interviews, and those wives would usually intervene to remind their husbands of certain
events, to add some comments, or to disagree with them.
I interviewed many refugee notables of the time. These refugees were camp
dwellers and received rations for a long period of time before becoming self-sufficient.
Interviewing these refugees was a hard task due to the bitterness they have about the
period of study and the humiliation of which it reminded them. Many refugees refused to
talk due to political concerns and did not trust my research or my affiliation.
Second, I analyze the UN documents that relate to the UN involvement in the
Palestine problem with a special focus on the Final Report of the United Nations
Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (1949) and on UNRWA's annual reports
to the General Assembly between 1950 and 1957.
Third, I rely on the "popular history" gained from the Jordanian daily newspapers
Filastin and Al-Difa' during the period of study. Despite being controlled by the
Jordanian government, the press has been of great help in shedding light on the major
issues relating to UNRWA and the way it was portrayed in the public media at the time.
The news items also served as a base on which I relied when starting my interviews.
I should admit that due to the uniqueness of both the Palestinian refugees and
UNRWA as discussed above, the implications of this study should only be carefully
generalized to other cases. The complexity of all the factors playing a role in this case
should not be simplified to create recommendations for any development or humanitarian
aid agencies. As discussed above, both Palestinian refugees and UNRWA represent a
unique case study, and they differ from other refugee groups or development agencies. In
addition, and even though I show clear evidence that exhibits the refugees' activism in
the development process, I make no claim that this is the only driving factor behind the
shift in UNRWA's mandate. Many other factors could be taken into consideration,
including the expansion of the educational system in Jordan in 1950s and 1960s and the
financial challenges or technical difficulties that UNRWA faced.
Having said that, this study should encourage other international development
agencies to take into consideration the important role that their local staff members can
play on many levels. This role goes beyond providing local knowledge to bridging a gap
with the local community and advocating for interests that may not necessarily seen or
appreciated by the international staff members.
CHAPTER FOUR: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East was established by United Nations General Assembly in 1949. The creation of
UNRWA came as a subsequent involvement of the United Nations in the Palestinian
question and the consequent refugee problem. The following chapter is divided into two
parts. The first part traces the historical involvement of the United Nations in the conflict
in Palestine. It exhibits the transformation of the UN role from a legislator to a mediator
during the years 1947-1950. The second part analyzes the role undertaken by the
Economic Survey Mission, a subsidiary committee that was created by the General
Assembly to deal with the refugee problem. It examines the image that the Economic
Survey Mission created for UNRWA as an apolitical and development agency, as well as
the image that it created for the target population as a collective, imaginary body of
refugees in need of development.
The United Nations and the Creation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem
During the early years of the Palestinian refugee problem, the UN had played
different roles with different stakeholders. The UN started as a legislature in 1947, when
it created the Partition Plan in the hope that Jewish and Arab political parties would adopt
it. In the aftermath of the war of 1947, the UN turned into a mediator between nation-
states competing over space. Failing in its role, and hoping that an apolitical process of
power transfer could solve a complex political problem, the UN turned itself into a
stakeholder. It adopted a role towards the refugees similar to the role that a nation-state
would adopt towards its citizens (Buehrig 1971). This section traces this change in the
UN mandate between 1947 and 1950.
In 1947, Great Britain announced the end of its mandate in Palestine. It did so after
26 years of committing itself to the Balfour Declaration, in which it had promised to help
establish a "National Home for the Jewish People in Palestine" while also secretly
promising Palestinian political leaders their own independent statehood. Conflict over the
land erupted between Palestinians, who comprised 67% of the population, and Jews, who
comprised 33% of the population. The General Assembly tried to contain the conflict. It
voted for the partition of Palestine between an Arab state and a Jewish one, while leaving
Jerusalem under the sovereignty of a special international regime. The Arab state was
envisaged to consist of 725,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews, while the Jewish state was
envisaged to consist of 497,000 Arabs and 498,000 Jews. Jerusalem was put under an
international sovereignty with 100,000 Jews and 105,000 Arabs (Buehrig 1971).
The partition did not work as planned, however. The Jewish Agency accepted the
proposal. The Arabs rejected the plan, believing that it was unfair in the quality and
quantity of land given to them. The UN offered the Jews 55% of a land of which they
owned only 6.5%.
Fighting between the Arabs and Jews escalated as soon as the Partition Plan was
approved. Britain planned to complete its withdrawal from Palestine on May 15, 1948.
Jewish groups organized themselves and announced their statehood one day before the
completion of the British withdrawal. The hostilities between Arab and Jewish forces
were escalating. The land of historic Palestine was divided into three parts: the new
Jewish state, occupying 77% of the land of historical Palestine; the West Bank, annexed
by Jordan; and Gaza, controlled by Egypt (Hajjar and Beinin 1988). The promised
Palestinian state never materialized as its indigenous Arab population, led by fear of
massacres and chaos, fled to the surrounding countries, Gaza, and the West Bank.
Different groups of Palestinians had different escape routes depending on their
geographic location within Palestine. Palestinians from the north fled to south Lebanon
and Syria, while those from south fled to Gaza, and those from the central Palestine fled
to the West Bank and Jordan. Palestinian refugees took their keys and important
documents without any other belongings and fled to the closest safe refuge. They were
sure that they would return soon (Schiff 1995).
However, a quick return became impossible. Refugees were admitted by the
surrounding countries and gathered into large groups depending on the village or town
from which they came. The difficulty of the situation became clear. Israel would not
allow the refugees back in the near future, while the host governments, poor and newly
recognized as independent, lacked the infrastructure to accommodate a huge number of
refugees 3. The situation was turning into a human disaster and the international
community decided to intervene.
3 In 1948, Jordan had a population of 440,000, as did the West Bank. In 1948, 70,000 Palestinians fled to
Jordan and 280,000 fled to the West Bank.
Faced with thousands of refugees, the newly independent state faced a challenge in meeting the increasing
demands of the refugees. Not only did the refugees demand infrastructure, aid, shelter, schools, and job
opportunities, they also demanded political participation and activism that they enjoyed in Palestine for
many decades.
The Jordanian government took many measures to accommodate the refugees while preserving their
temporary status in front of the Palestinians and the international community. First, the government
established the Ministry of Refugee Affairs, which was soon replaced by the Ministry of Development and
Reconstruction. The government made clear and precise its duties toward the refugees: aiding in relief
work and census operations, transferring refugees, choosing and renting the sites for the camps, providing
basic infrastructure for the camp, and covering some medical treatment and expenses (Plascov 1981).
Second, the government annexed the West Bank in April, 1950 after the Jericho Conference, in which
Palestinian political leaders who opposed the Government of All Palestine showed support to the King of
Jordan (Brand, 1995). The annexation allowed refugees in Jordan to enjoy the Jordanian citizenship with all
Private international voluntary organizations stepped in to provide humanitarian
services to the refugees. The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS), and the
Pontifical Mission in Palestine provided immediate assistance by supplying food, tents,
sanitation, and basic health services. However, the organizations were incapable of
handling the problem on such a large scale over a long period of time. Stronger
intervention became necessary.
In July, 1948, the League of Arab States appealed to the UN for help with the
refugee problem. The UN channeled the issue to the International Refugee Organization
(IRO) in Geneva. But the IRO, established as a temporary organization to deal with the
WWII refugees, declined to help.
At this point, the UN shifted from being a distant legislator to a close mediator. It
appointed Count Folke Bernadotte as mediator in 1948. A committee of the General
Assembly composed of representatives of China, France, the USSR, the UK, and the US
assigned him three main duties: maintaining the common services necessary to the safety
of the community, protecting the holy places, and promoting a peaceful solution.
However, Bernadotte pushed for a more active role of the UN as a stakeholder. He
created a 60-day United Nations Disaster Relief Project (UNDRP) to coordinate aid to
the refugees through the local governments and nongovernmental organizations. Before
rights and obligations. However, it paralyzed the Palestinians' attempts to create an independent political
entity. Palestinian political leaders at the time proved to be fragmented in their visions and strategies.
Generally speaking, the government was very careful to show support to and solidarity with the refugees. It
feared their anger that might transform into violence in the camps. At the same time, the government did
not have a say in meeting their goal in returning to their homes. On more practical and daily issues, the
government had more leverage to exert pressure over UNRWA to meet the refugees' demands. "Name and
shame" was the strategy that the refugees used to pressure the Jordanian government to exert its pressure on
UNRWA.
his assassination in September 1948, Bernadotte recommended the creation of a
conciliation commission to the General Assembly to settle the pending issues between
Israel and the Arab states, including the refugee problem. He was clear that the UN had a
responsibility towards the refugees:
The international community must accept its share of responsibility until a final
settlement is achieved......[T]he choice is between saving the lives of many
thousands of people now or permitting them to die....[I]t would be an offense
against the principles of elemental justice if these innocent victims of the conflict
were denied the right to return to their homes while Jewish immigrants flow into
Palestine, and indeed, at least offer the threat of permanent replacement of the
Arab refugees who have been rooted in the land for centuries (Progress Report of
the UN Mediator to Palestine 1948, VI).
Bernadotte was the first UN official to take steps to get the UN involved as a
stakeholder in the refugee problem. He did so through three consequential steps. First, he
appealed to UNICEF and states that had important trade relations with Palestine for
relief. Second, he institutionalized the refugee problem through the establishment of a
headquarters in Beirut, hiring 16 officers from the UN and other agencies, and partnering
with institutions including the FAO, WHO, UNESCO, and IRO for technical and
financial assistance. Third, he sought to end his temporary role by channeling the
responsibility through the General Assembly to another possible organization (Buehrig
1971).
In November, 1948, the General Assembly passed resolution 212, which created the
United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR). The temporary agency was
created to operate from December, 1948 until August, 1949 with a budget of $32 million
(Schiff 1995). It had an administrative role of subcontracting relief work to the voluntary
organizations including the ICRC in Israel and the West Bank, the AFSC in Gaza and
part of Israel, and the Lebanese Red Cross Society (LRCS) in Lebanon, Syria, and
Jordan. The Secretary-General appointed Stanton Griffis, the American ambassador to
Egypt, as a director. UNRPR grew to have 50 staff posts and two headquarters, an
administrative one in Geneva and an operational one in Beirut.
In December, 1948, the General Assembly passed resolution 194 (IlI), which
emphasized the refugees' right to return or compensation:
Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with
their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and
that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return
and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law
or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible
(GA Resolution 194 (III) 1948, para 11).
Under the same resolution, the General Assembly created the Palestine Conciliation
Commission (PCC) to reach a settlement between Israel and the Arab states. The
committee was formed of representatives from France, Turkey, and the United States.
The creation of the commission reflected the fading hopes of return and indicated
implicitly the viability of resettlement. It became clear that Israel would not allow the
Palestinian refugees back to their properties, especially with the rapid Jewish immigration
to Israel that was estimated as 15,000 per month (Schiff 1995). Resolution 194 (III)
instructed:
[T]he Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and
economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of
compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United
Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate
organs and agencies of the United Nations.
The PCC, with guidance from the US Department of State, established the
Economic Survey Mission (ESM) in August, 1949. The creation of the ESM was a
milestone and an instrumental body that lead to the creation of UNRWA.
The EMS Report and the Developmental Discourse
The following section traces the work of the Economic Survey Mission work. It
examines the discourse the Mission had created about UNRWA and about the refugees.
The analysis challenges the discourse by examining a few social, economic, and political
realities on the ground. It also compares this discourse to an international one that was
created after the World War II.
The Mission had a body of experts to recommend economic measures to facilitate
repatriation or resettlement. Gordon Clapp, the Chairman of the Tennessee Valley
Authority, led the commission with the help of American experts in three main technical
disciplines that were regarded as keys to solving the refugee problem: agriculture,
engineering, and economics.
The governments of the major players- the United States, the host countries, and
Israel-supported the Mission. The United States was very keen to find a solution for the
refugee problem in order to stabilize the contested Middle East. American officials'
hopes were high that resettling the refugees in the host countries would be an opportunity
to set up some development projects and revitalize the stagnating economies of the
Middle East (Schiff 1995). Arab governments showed interest in cooperation, as they
realized that the refugees would probably stay in their lands. These countries, newly
declared independent, wanted financial and technical assistance from the West. Israel
also supported the Mission, as it saw a solution only through resettlement rather than
repatriation. Allowing the indigenous Palestinians to return to their homes was not on the
Israeli horizon, as they were seen as a threat to Israel's economic and political stability.
The Mission had an extremely difficult task. It had to solve a political problem
through creating economic stability. The Mission made it clear that "economic
development cannot itself make peace where the political will to peace is lacking"
(Buehrig 1971). The Mission published its 120-page final report in December, 1949.
However, the report did not touch upon the original problem of the displacement of the
refugees or their right and desire to go back to their properties:
This final report...... does not deal directly with the problem of the refugees from
Palestine. Yet, the obstacles in the way of economic development in the Middle East
are much the same as those hampering the rehabilitation of the Arab refugees.
Instead, the report transformed the whole political problem into an economic one
from which both the Palestinian refugees and the host countries were suffering. It was a
problem of knowledge and capital that the less developed populations, including the
Palestinian refugees, suffer from:
The solution of the problem of the poverty and unemployment of the refugees is,
therefore, inseparable from a solution of the problem of poverty and hunger as that
already affects a large section of the population of the Middle East.
Hunger is a basic disease in many parts of the world. The hand-to-mouth existence
of millions is a challenge to the technical and scientific knowledge of and to the
wealth possessed by, those people whose standard of living is a measure of the goal
to which the people of the under-developed areas may aspire...
...How simple, therefore, to suppose that could the poorer people and the poorer
regions but acquire from those more blessed materially a pro rate share of the
world's goods, poverty would be eradicated and a great cause of strife would
disappear ......
Technical and scientific knowledge can contribute to increasing material standards
of living in under-developed areas. The better use of water and land, the control
and eradication of disease and pests, an increased manufacture and flow of goods
and the spread of education, require the application of what man knows or can find
out about the productive capacity of men and things.
The beginning of productive works recommended in the interim report is assumed
as a prelude to the proposals made herein, which, in the opinion of the Mission, if
translated into action, can lead the way to a fuller development of the resources of
the countries of the Middle East. Such development is essential to stability...(ESM
1949, vii-viii)
A few points are of interest for us in the report.
First, the report looked at the problem as merely an economic one, failing to
recognize the interdependence between the economic, social, cultural, and political
factors. In his book The Passing of Traditional Society, Daniel Lerner argues that
economic, political, social, and cultural factors are highly associated with each other
(Lerner 1958). It is worth mentioning here that despite the fact that the report assumed no
repatriation would take place, it was cautious not to use inflammatory words, such as
resettlement, that would attach the refugees to a certain place. Instead, the report made
sure to use more generic terms such as "rehabilitation" and "reintegration."
Secondly, though the report touched upon the idea of who is a Palestinian refugee,
it did not define this clearly. Rather than looking at the whole body of refugees as a point
of departure, the report focused on the body of refugees in need of relief, not realizing
that many of them were in need due to their forced exile and their inability to transfer
their assets immediately to the host countries. The report estimated the number of
refugees as 774,000 and the number of refugees in need for relief as 652,000.
Thirdly, the report relied on questionable sources of information. It relied on the
statistics of the British government in Palestine, which collected data on the whole
mandated area of Palestine in 1922 and 1931. After 1931, British authorities had regular
and quarter annual estimates of the population. These were not reliable since they did not
capture the major changes that Palestine was going through. While it is beyond the
capacity of this research to analyze these changes, it is worth highlighting a few of them.
For example, the population increased significantly due to high birth rates and the
migration of European Jews into Palestine. In 1946, population growth in Palestine was
75% more than it had been in 1931 (Hagopian and Zahlan 1974). The Palestinian
economy also benefited during World War II because of British dependence on Palestine
as a center for communications. Both of these factors reflected significantly on the
demographics and economies of Palestine during the 17 years in which no census was
taken.
Fourthly, by focusing on the illiterate and needy refugees and excluding the human
or financial capital of refugees, the report made a broad generalization about the refugees.
It portrayed refugees as a homogenous body of uneducated and poor peasants without
capturing the cultural, economic, and professional disparities among them. It did not take
into consideration the fact that 35% of Palestinians were town dwellers, including upper
and middle bourgeois groups.
The report did not capture the economic disparities among the Palestinian society or
acknowledge Palestinian economic success before exile. Palestinian refugees did not
necessarily lack capital before their exile. They became poor afterward due to the
political situation imposed on them. While it is true that Palestine suffered from a
worldwide recession in the 1930s, Palestine was one of the most prosperous countries of
the Middle East by the end of the World War II. In addition to being the center for the
British communications during the war, its economy benefited from transport,
construction, oil refining, and agricultural exports. This prosperity paralleled new forms
of entrepreneurial investment and trade that engaged Palestine in the world market.
Palestinians invested in shared, government bonds, and commodity stocks. According to
the British estimates, Palestinians had a capital ownership of 132.6 million pounds
sterling in 1945. Out of this capital, 56% was in the form of rural landholdings that were
confiscated by Israel and could not be transferred abroad upon exile.
Palestinians also had other forms of assets. They had foreign liquid assets of more
than 39 million pounds sterling, bank deposits in Palestine of 7 million pounds sterling,
and deposits in the Ottoman Bank and Barclays Bank of 3 million pounds sterling (of
which 2.5 million pounds sterling were released by the end of 1955). Palestinian refugees
in Jordan were expected to transfer 10 million pounds sterling to that country (Smith
1986). While statistics show that the average refugee's income was 8.9 pounds sterling in
1951, the average income in Palestine was 41 pounds sterling in 1941. All of these
numbers negate the "poverty paradigm" that the report had constructed.
Palestinian bourgeois were not only wealthy, but had their tangible impact on the
host countries. They were able to transfer part of their cash savings to the Arab countries.
Even before 1948, some businessmen opened branches in Arab capitals like Amman and
Beirut. They channeled more money to the Arab countries as the situation became more
dangerous in Palestine. After relocating or opening branches in Arab capitals,
Palestinians started expanding their businesses. For example, the Tuqan family from
Nablus expanded its agricultural operations in Jordan and started new industries. The
Shoman family from Jerusalem transferred the headquarters of the Arab Bank in
Jerusalem to Amman, where it became one of the largest banks in the world. It is this
network of Palestinian entrepreneurs that controlled a network of corporations in the
Middle East by the 1960s (Smith 1986).
Palestinians in the land of historical Palestine did more than farming. Daniel Lerner
argues that possibly 50% of the Palestinians had some contact with non-farming
occupations (Lerner 1958). Over 25,000 Arab industrial workers had been organized into
more than 30 unions.
The report also failed to capture the diversity in educational attainment in Palestine.
The educational system in Palestine was controlled by the British adminisration, which
followed a very restrictive policy in school expansion and devoted only 2% of the
country's budget for education. However, it went through some expansion after 1943 that
made it favorably comparable with other surrounding countries, including Jordan. By the
end of the British Mandate, there were 827 schools in Palestine, accommodating 30% of
students aged between six 6 and 20 (Abu Lughod 1973). Students composed 11.7% of the
total population of Palestine, the second highest percentage in the Arab world after
Lebanon. In 1948, every major town had a complete public school preparing students for
the general secondary examination. Other towns also had secondary classes, as did many
private Muslim and Christian schools in towns and in villages. Palestine had three
excellent secondary schools in Cairo, Beirut and London where most teachers got their
educations. These were: the Arab College, al-Rashidiya, and Jerusalem Girls' College. In
1944, 78 students received the Arabic matriculation, 35 the English matriculation, 46 the
Arab School Certificate, and 25 the English School Certificate. Many other well-educated
students sat for the exam but did not receive it. The increase in education from 5.6% in
1931 to 8.7% in 1944, and to 11.7% in 1948, reflected a strong desire that drove the
educational system in Palestine, a fact that the report did not capture (Hagopian and
Zahlan 1974). It is interesting to remember for later discussion that many students in the
classrooms were older than the average age, due to their desire to receive education
despite their harsh conditions. This made the students politically aware of what was going
on (Badran 1980).
As opposed to the paradigm of poverty and ignorance that the report constructed
about the refugees, another paradigm of knowledge and capital was constructed about the
developed countries of the West. The report failed to acknowledge the local knowledge
and assumed a need for international intervention instead:
The highly developed nations of the world did not make their way by wishing. By
work and risk they forced the earth, the soil, the forests and the rivers to yield them
riches. They pooled their energy and resourced by taxation and mutual enterprise
to discover new ways of doing things. They worked, they invented, they educated
and trained their children, and they invested in their national and their private
enterprises...
...There is no substitute for the application of work and local enterprise to each
country's own resources. Help to those who have the will to help themselves should
be the primary policy guiding and restraining the desire of the more developed
areas of the world to help the less developed lands (EMS 1949, vii-viii).
The report rejected immediate large projects in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria due to
the lack of capital, skills, research, governmental organization, and administrative
experience. However, it recommended another program:
Programme of public works to employ Palestine refugees, start them on the road to
rehabilitation and bring an end to their enforced idleness and the demoralizing
effect of the dole...... the purpose of the proposed programme of relief and public
works is four-fold: it will halt the demoralizing process of pauperization, outcome
of a dole, prolonged; the opportunity to work will increase the practical
alternatives available to refugees, and thereby encourage a more realistic view of
the kind of future they want and the kind they can achieve; a works programme
properly planned will add to the productive economy of the countries where the
refugees are located; the chance to earn a living will reduce the need for relief and
bring its cost within the ability of the Near Eastern countries to meet without United
Nations Assistance (EMS 1949, 17).
For the short term, the report advised shifting the emphasis from relief to work in
order to make the refugees self-sufficient. The goal was to launch projects of low cost
and high labor, such as forestation and road building. The report hoped that the work
program would run from April, 1950 to June, 1951 and would employ 100,000 refugees
with 400,000 dependents, all of whom would eventually be removed from the relief rolls.
The report predicted the program to cost $53.7 M--$19 M for relief and $34.7 M for
work. It recommended that the two elements should be administered by the same agency
without help from voluntary organizations. The title the report gave to its program is also
interesting: Work Relief, which would make it seem easier on the refugees than the word
work by itself would. The report suggested that the new program would not supply
rations to refugees after December, 1950 but would turn over the responsibility to the
Arab governments. The report envisioned that "the programme of works relief must take
the precedence over that for the direct relief, the latter decreasing as the former growing":
The amount of relief and the amount of the employment in each family or village
group should have a direct relationship. The formula is more work and less relief
Humanitarian considerations should temper administrative decisions, but the
success of the works relief programme will inevitably be measured by the speed
with which direct relief diminishes, as men and their families begin to earn a living
(EMS 1949, 18).
Arturo Escobar argues that after World War II, the international institutional
apparatus started inventing the development discourse:
What we now have is a vast landscape of identities, the "illiterate," the "landless
peasants," women bypassed by development," "the hungry and malnourished,",
those belonging to the informal sector", "urban marginals" and so forth, all of
them created by the development discourse and catalogues among many
abnormalities that development would treat and reform through appropriate
"intervention" (Escobar, 1995).
In the light of this, the report suggests two paradigms. First, there is a systematic
production of knowledge about many aspects of the target population, including the
economic, social, and political. Second, and just as important, is a creation for a large
institutional network at all levels:
The depiction of the Third World as "underdeveloped" has been an essential and
constitutive element of the globalization of capital in the post-World War II period;
perhaps more importantly, a cultural discourse began that not only placed the
Third World in a position of inferiority, but that, more clearly and efficiently than
ever, subjected it to the "scientific," normalizing action of Western, cultural-
political technologies-in even more devastating ways than its colonial predecessor
(Escobar 1995, 66).
In the light of this, the development process implied the destruction of traditional
living conditions to normalize them with the western ones, which would cause
restructuring of the society (Escobar 1995). The development process was seen as the
remedy for a political problem in addition to a developmental one.
To conclude, this section challenges the report presented by the Economic Survey
Mission by deconstructing the body of refugees and examining the economic and
educational diversity among its members and the assets they could provide. This section
compares this report to a larger developmental discourse that emerged after World War
II.
CHAPTER FIVE: UNRWA (1950-1957)
The following section analyzes UNRWA's constitutional origins and mandate. It
then surveys chronologically the transformation in the mandate from the reintegration
projects to the education projects between 1950 and 1957. A full treatment of this aspect
is not feasible, since documentation for these projects in the confidential files of
UNRWA, the UN, and the Jordanian government is understandably not available.
However, UNRWA's annual reports to the General Assembly contain enough on the
subject to permit a general review of the projects. At this stage, I make almost no effort to
analyze the success or the failure of these projects. Rather, I try to give an overview and
lay the ground for the following chapter, which highlights possible un-narrated causes of
success or failure for UNRWA's projects.
UNRWA's Constitutional Origins
As recommended by the Economic Survey Mission, the General Assembly without
dissent passed Resolution 302, which established United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWAPRNE). The goal of
establishing UNRWA was twofold:
(a) To carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works
programmes as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission;
(b) To consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures
to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief
and works projects is no longer available (GA Resolution 302 1949, IV).
The General Assembly created an Advisory Commission that consisted of
representatives from France, the UK, US and Turkey, the latter as a representative for the
Middle East. Each member of these countries was accredited with one of the host
countries, in the hope of facilitating negotiations between them and UNRWA. The
Advisory Commission expanded to accommodate the governments of Syria and Jordan in
1952, and Egypt, Lebanon, and Belgium in 1953. By bringing these governments as
stakeholders, UNRWA had acknowledged the importance of their role. The director
acknowledged this in his annual report of 1953:
Another event of great importance, the effects of which have not yet been fully felt
but which may be far-reaching, was the enlargement of the Advisory Commission
by the inclusion of representatives of three of the four host countries--Syria, Jordan
and Egypt. Their familiarity with the points of view of those Governments and with
the refugee problem has already assisted in overcoming administrative difficulties,
and there is reason to hope that this assistance will increase as time goes on
(UNRWA Annual Report 1953, para 8).
UNRWA is a unique agency among other UN agencies in terms of its autonomy
and operations. UNRWA enjoys a high level of autonomy from the General Assembly
and even from its advisory commission for two main reasons. The first is its
constitutional origins under Article 22 of the UN charter, and the second is its funding
mechanisms that do not rely on the UN, but on voluntary contributions from
governments. At the same time, UNRWA is a highly operational and a quasi-
governmental agency performing daily executive operations of providing social and
health services usually rendered by a nation-state to its citizens. UNRWA is a non-
territorial state in the territory of another state.
The General Assembly founded UNRWA under Article 22 of the UN Charter,
which authorizes the Assembly to "establish subsidiary organs as it deems necessary to
the performance of its functions." Article 22 has no legislative power; rather, it
constitutes a machinery to reach the UN's goals. Many subsidiary agencies, including the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF), were created through Article 22. However, UNRWA differs
substantially from all other UN organs since they are not as operational as UNRWA and
do not have as much contact with their beneficiaries. They also do not have a large body
of staff members, as UNRWA does. The UN defines an operational agency as one
"entrusted with the task of executing programs of relief, rehabilitation, and other forms of
assistance by furnishing supplies and services to Governments or directly to the people
concerned" (United Nations 1955, Vol I, P 669).
UNRWA's financial independence from the UN emphasizes its autonomy.
UNRWA's funds are channeled voluntarily in cash and in kind from contributing
governments from all around the world. This way of funding creates leverage for the
contributing governments to attach their conditions during the pledging conference at the
General Assembly. However, history shows that the contributing governments have
rarely done so except for the US and the UK, who exert their power on UNRWA through
naming senior staff members of their citizens (Buehrig 1971). On the other hand,
UNRWA's director reports to the General Assembly through the president, who channels
the report to the Special Political Committee. The General Assembly can raise policy
questions but does not propose resolutions that contain specific directions. The Secretary
General, in consultation with the Advisory Commission, appoints the director, who
decides to appoint and remove staff members.
UNRWA's Reintegration Projects
UNRWA's ultimate goal was to remove as many refugees as possible from the
relief rolls by helping them become self-sufficient. In order to accomplish this task,
UNRWA went through four main phases of integration projects: small-scale training and
employment projects, large-scale government controlled projects, immigration projects,
and large-scale development projects (Schiff 1995).
1. Small-scale training and employment-creating projects
UNRWA issued interest-free loans for the refugees to help them start enterprises
such as shoemaking and carpentry. However, the plan did not work as envisaged. The
project proved very costly on UNRWA and the economies of scale were low. An
UNRWA official observed the following when visiting these small projects in 1951:
Business approach of the refugee is considerably different from the highly
developed methods of the West. The Arab businessman to him was very secretive
about his business and not willing to share the information with others and so the
agency had no criteria of who could be removed from the rations and who could
not. In addition, there were only a few agency personnel to handle the issue (Schiff
1995, 32).
In order to accelerate the reintegration process, the agency established the
Development Bank of Jordan with a capital of $1.4 M, of which UNRWA paid $1.12 M
while the Jordanian government contributed the rest. UNRWA financed the bank to make
loans to the refugees for small projects in proportion to its contribution to the capital.
However, the bank started denying access to loans to refugees who did not have enough
assets. Problems between the Jordanian government and UNRWA were on rise.
In 1951, UNRWA's director reported informally that money had to be taken from
the budget for the works to be paid for the rations. He mentioned that the increase in
prices due to the Korean War and drought made it harder on UNRWA to survive with the
limited budget it has for the relief. Also, he admitted that lands where refugees lived were
not good for agriculture, which meant that refugees had to be transferred across the
borders to get them resettled through agricultural projects (UNRWA Annual Report
1951, para 44).
2. Medium-sized, government-controlled projects
These included road building and forestation, among many other projects. The goal
of the project was to find work opportunities for the refugees while helping in
development projects in the host country. These projects faced many economic problems
shortly after their launching: high administrative costs, small economies of scale, low
labor motivation and efficiency, and low demand in the market. UNRWA claimed that
the government tried to push for projects from which it would benefit, without taking the
public good of the refugees in consideration. As will be discussed later, there was conflict
of interest between the Jordanian government and UNRWA in many cases.
3. Immigration projects
UNRWA provided subsidizations for refugees to resettle in Iraq, Libya, US, or
Europe and to start up new businesses. The immigration process also proved to be a
failure. Each refugee cost $294 to travel and resettle, with no guarantee for sustainability.
Many were not be able to sustain themselves and returned shortly. Libya and Iraq, the
main host countries, were skeptical of the project.
4. The New Program
Later in 1951, UNRWA realized the high expenses of the first three projects. It had
an alternative of large scale regional water development projects in the frame of a "New
Program." The agency was ambitious and hoped to raise $200 M for the projects.
UNRWA's second director, John Blandford, was the architect of the New Program.
Blandford was an expert on housing and also the former manager of the Tennessee
Valley Authority. Blandford believed that massive agricultural irrigation projects would
create employment for the refugees through construction in the short term and
agricultural work in the long term. Blandford laid out his plan for his New Program
before the General Assembly (Schiff 1995).
In January 1952, the General Assembly passed Resolution 513, in which it endorsed
the following:
The programme recommended by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
the relief and reintegration of Palestine refugees, which envisages the expenditure
of US$ 50 million for relief and $200 million for reintegration over and above such
contributions as may be made by local government, to be carried out over a period
of approximately three years starting as of 1 July 1951 (GA Resolution 513, 1952).
The goal of the New Program was to help reintegrate 150,000 families-one third
through vocational training, grants and housing in urban areas and two thirds through
agricultural projects. It was also assumed that the host governments would take the
responsibility as soon as possible (Buehrig 1971).
UNRWA's plans borrowed from older ones that the British mandate had prepared
in order to fully utilize the resources in the area. For example, in 1939, Jordan's
Government Development Director, Michael lodines, suggested that more people could
be settled in the Jordan Valley if water resources were used efficiently. He suggested the
diversion of the Yarmuk River before it joined the Jordan River. By this, Yarmuk River
could be used to irrigate the east bank of the Jordan River or stored in Lake Tiberius
(Schiff 1995). Another study was conducted in 1944 by Walter C. Lowdermilk. It
was modeled on the Tennessee Valley Authority and proposed the development of farms
and industry to provide a place for 4 million Jews from Europe in addition to the 1.8
million Arabs and Jews already living in Palestine and Transjordan. In 1951, the
Jordanian government consulted American engineers to survey the Jordan and Yarmuk
Valleys to locate the best sites for dams and for a network of irrigation canals. Many
parties financed the contract, including the United States Operations Mission to Jordan
($1 M), UNRWA ($0.3 M), and the Jordanian Development Board ($0.2 M) (UNRWA
Annual Report 1954, para 7).
Jordan had the lion's portion of the funds devoted to the New Program. Out of the
$200 M, UNRWA assigned $111 M for Syria, Jordan and Egypt, in addition to $11 M for
Jordan to be spent on irrigation projects and vocational training. In March, 1953,
UNRWA promised Jordan $40 M for the Unified Development Plan that will be
discussed later (Schiff 1995). 4
However, the money raised for the New Program was channeled to cover up the
rising cost of the relief program. Refugees were not being removed from the rolls as
predicted, and it became clear that the New Program was not a success. The shortage of
funds was a continuous threat for UNRWA.
5. Unified Development Plan
4 By the time UNRWA started operations in 1950, Jordan had not been recognized as a member of the UN
yet and it was not until early 1951 that UNRWA reached agreement with the Jordanian government. The
agreement was broad and did not go beyond the UN Charter and the Convention on Privileges and
Immunities of 1946 (articles 2, 100, 104 and 105). The relation between the Jordanian government and
UNRWA was full of tension. The government had always had leverage over UNRWA by its ability to put
hurdles over its operations, mobilize the refugees against its operations, restrict the movement of its local
staff members, and protect its facilities at times of strikes and protests. On the other hand, UNRWA had
leverage over the Jordanian government. The agency had been of great use for the state, proposing and
funding development projects from one side and helping in the relief effort by funding and execution from
the other. Because UNRWA operated under the patronage of the General Assembly, the agency enjoyed no
flexibility in withdrawing its services from the host country if there were problems with the government.
In March, 1953, the Tennessee Valley Authority, financed by the US Department of
State and on behalf of UNRWA, hired the Boston-based company Charles T. Main to
carry out a six-month long study of the Jordan River and to evaluate the former water
development projects that had been designed earlier. Charles T. Main suggested merging
the New Program with the Yarmuk River Plan formerly proposed to the Jordanian
government by American consultants. The Unified Development Plan focused on mere
technical knowledge, leaving politics aside:
Many of the earlier plans were prepared when the present political boundaries did
not exist. Partly for this reason, but principally in the interests of sound engineering
practice, the Tennessee Valley Authority was invited to disregard political
boundaries, and to prepare a report indicating the most efficient method of utilizing
the whole of the watershed in the best interests of the area (Unified Development
Plan 1953, introductory notes).
The Unified Development Plan was predicted to be a benchmark in the integration
process of the refugees. The ultimate goal of the project was providing employment
through agriculture for 143,000 refugees, almost one third of the refugee population in
Jordan. Refugees would comprise 85% of the labor force and 90% of the people to settle
in the area (Schiff 1995). The project was estimated to irrigate 500,000 dunams (126,000
acres) and to produce 167 million kilowatt hours of electric power. Construction of dams
and canals was estimated to create work opportunities for 12,000 laborers for several
years. It was estimated that a family might become self-supporting by the cultivation of
an average of twenty irrigated dunams.
In October, Gordon Clapp, Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, presented
the Unified Development Plan to UNRWA. The United Nations was cautious and
considered that it was not an UNRWA plan. Arab and Israeli official reactions were not
promising. The United States backed the plan and tried to lobby for it in the General
Assembly. President Eisenhower assigned Special Ambassador Eric Johnston to establish
Arab-Israeli agreement (New York Times [NYC], 15, October, 1953). Johnston went into
rounds of negotiations until 1955. The Jordanian Prime Minister objected to the plan,
which required cooperation with Israel. He mentioned that Jordan was more prepared for
economic hardships rather than with dealing with Israel. Two years of negotiations were
a series of frustrations for Johnston and ended up with the Arab states and Israel
announcing that unilateral water diversions by the other side would be considered an act
of aggression (Schiff 1995). The ambitious economic development plan became
paralyzed by the difficult political climate of the Middle East.
In 1956, UNRWA's director mentioned that the Unified Development Plan would
not go any further due to the host governments' refusal to accept it. In his annual report,
the director mentioned the following:
While the Agency, therefore, is continuing its small-scale programmes and is ready
to participate in the Yarmuk-Jordan project when related political problems are
resolved, it requests the General Assembly to consider the enlargement of the
Agency's mandate so as to permit expenditures, by loans or grants, upon general
development programmes, with which the immediate employment or self-support of
refugees need not be directly connected, but which will eventually benefit the
refugees through increasing the general economic activity of the country (UNRWA
Annual Report 1956, para 73).
By mid-1956, the agency had spent $27.5 M on integration out of the $200 M
original integration fund (Schiff 1995). In 1957, the annual report mentioned that no
progress has been made in the Yarmuk. In the subsequent years, the only mention for the
Yarmuk project was through the anti-malaria campaign. Not only did the project fail to
achieve its promised goal of integrating the refugees in their new countries and vitalizing
the stagnating economies of the host societies, it failed to sustain itself as an
infrastructure improvement. Faced with the political realities on the ground, a technical
project supported by the US and the UN, with a budget of more than $200 M was
doomed.
UNRWA's Education Program
This section traces the development of UNRWA's educational program, which was
not part of the original mandate assigned by the General Assembly. When UNRWA
started its operations in 1950, it was planned that UNRWA would not open more schools.
However, UNRWA's educational system grew quantitatively and qualitatively to be a
driving force for the educational systems in the host countries. UNRWA's schools
produced the first generation of gulf teachers as well as the second generation of
UNRWA local staff members. So in this sense, UNRWA became like a state that was
raising its citizens.
UNRPR made no provisions for education in its budget when it started its
operations in 1948. In 1949, UNESCO established 61 schools in the host countries that
accommodated 33,631 students. When UNRWA started operations in 1950, it inherited
114 schools with 43,658 students and 846 staff members. At the time, twenty percent of
the refugee children in Jordan were receiving education in these schools (UNRWA
Annual Report 1951, para 203-204). Schools inherited from UNESCO were "emergency
schools" that were set up in large, worn out tents and had few tables, desks, chairs, or
stools by the time UNRWA took over.
UNRWA did not have the capacity to handle the educational system by itself. It had
to share the work with UNESCO. The former was in charge of administrative issues
including finances, purchases and payments, while the latter took care of technical issues
including curricula, books, and school situations (UNRWA Annual Report 1951, para
131). UNESCO made available the services of its staff members to act as educational
advisors to UNRWA (UNRWA Annual Report 1951, para 130). The syllabus and final
examination in the UNRWA-UNESCO schools were the same as the Jordanian ones.
The two agencies also agreed that no more schools would be opened since the life
of UNRWA was to end within a year (UNRWA Annual Report 1951, para 132). In 1950,
UNRWA allocated $175,000 from its budget to education, while UNESCO allocated
$53,000. The two agencies raised the salaries of teachers to meet the local standards:
In the former emergency programme, much of the teaching was done either on a
voluntary basis, or for such low wages that teachers were less well paid than the
cleaners employed in the camps. Classification and proper compensation for these
teachers was therefore one of the major responsibilities of the UNESCO
representative. Since May 1950, the monthly wage has been raised and is now at a
maximum of $42 for headmasters, and $37 for teachers, which approaches local
standards (UNRWA Annual Report 1951, para 203-204).
The expansion was noticeable in 1951, when UNRWA allocated around $320,000
to education complemented by approximately $81,000 from UNESCO. The expansion
reached many quantitative and qualitative dimensions of UNRWA's educational system.
It included appointing 19 refugee teachers in government schools to allow the
government to absorb more than 1,500 refugee students in its schools. At the time there
were no universities in Jordan, but the agency allocated $15,000 to three Lebanese and
Syrian universities to educate Palestinian refugees who studied medicine, pharmacy, arts,
science, and engineering. UNRWA also started repairing old tents, building mud walls,
laying floors, and even constructing new schools.
In 1952 UNRWA provided summer training courses to 612 of its teachers.
UNRWA still had poor premises; two thirds of the classes were being held in tents, many
of them overcrowded with more than fifty students in a classroom. Equipment was poor
and many classrooms had no boards to write on. UNRWA was not able to meet the
refugees' demands, it refused as many refugee students as it could admit and it had no
secondary classes. Despite these poor conditions, reports showed that the examination
results for the agency's students were at least as good as those of students in other public
or private schools in the host countries.
In 1953, the educational system was further expanded. UNRWA provided summer
training courses to more than 800 of its teachers. UNRWA admitted more students and
transferred more tents into buildings. It reduced the average number of students per class
from 50 to 47. It also increased the salaries of teachers to compare favorably with those
of the host countries. Finally, it made plans to establish vocational training schools to
start operating in the next year. Late in the same year, UNRWA opened a vocational
training center in Kalandia on the West Bank. The center provided courses in many skills.
In 1954, many developments took place. All classrooms were transferred into
buildings, diversified forms of education were offered to students completing their
elementary stage, 200 university scholarships were offered, more secondary classes
started, new measures were introduced to improve the efficiency of the teaching staff
including increasing the number of inspectors, and more emphasis was placed on teacher
summer training programs. Finally, UNRWA offered educational broadcasting for the
benefit of refugees in isolated areas. The programs were made possible in coordination
with the Near East Broadcasting Station in Cyprus. Local staff members wrote the
programs during their spare time (Buehrig 1971).
In 1955, the agency decided to admit increasing numbers into secondary schools
each year, until at least the level existing in Jordan was reached. UNRWA realized that
the percentage of students receiving education in Jordan was on rise. UNRWA had to
cope with this development so it did not "impose a distinct handicap upon the adolescent
refugee population. Refugee young men and women, if not educated up to prevailing
local standards, will not be in position to take advantage of opportunities for employment
requiring standard educational qualifications."
The Annual Report highlighted the achievements of the educational apparatus of
UNRWA:
It is only fair to point out that when Agency pupils compete in government
examinations with the pupils of government or private schools, the pupils ofAgency
schools almost invariably receive higher marks, pupil for pupil and school for
school. It is therefore considered appropriate for the Agency to take this
opportunity of commending the teaching staff as a whole, regardless of their
professional qualifications, for their enthusiasm, mental alertness and achievements
under many difficult conditions (UNRWA Annual Report 1955, para 6)
Conclusion
This chapter was a descriptive analysis for the transformation in UNRWA's
mandate. It shows clearly the failure of UNRWA's grand development projects. The
causes of this failure are rarely addressed in literature. Different stakeholders had their
biases when looking at causes of failure:
In a spam of technological euphoria, the United States forced economic
development plans intended to absorb the refugees into the labor force, but the
practical and political knots of the Middle East could not be united. Perhaps worse
than the failure of the ambitious water plans, from UNRWA's standpoint, was the
sapping of the refugee confidence in the organization caused by the hypocrisy of
proclaiming repatriation while planning resettlement... The high hopes ignored the
cold political realities, always there.... the water schemes crashed, mass
resettlement folded, and a humbled UNRWA turned back to what it did well, helping
refugees one by one, drops of aid in a sea of privation (Schiff 1995, 46-47).
A senior government official at the time denied that the refugees or the Jordanian
government had anything to do with the failure of the projects:
It was all due to lack of funds. Many states promised to donate money to the
development projects, but with time they did not do so.
An UNRWA senior staff member disagrees strongly with this statement. He sees
the failure due to technical challenges and lack of human capacity to carry in the
situation. He recalls UNRWA's work to find water in the desert in a region that it did not
know. He also recalls housing projects that were blown by the winds:
They didn't know how to do the job. They were foreign engineers and did not know
the peculiarities of the area.
On the other hand, many refugees insist that they had their role in replacing
UNRWA's economic projects with the educational one. Rarely is this point of view
adopted by mainstream discourse about UNRWA. Hence, it is worth recollecting some
popular memory. The following quotations will help in the transition to the chapter about
the refugees' role in reshaping UNRWA's mandate.
Late in 1950, a newspaper article mentioned that UNRWA has gotten "exhausted
from preparing reports and creating imaginative projects", and hence, the agency is
considering more realistic projects. A committee of educated youngsters has been formed
to select teachers and open new schools. The committee has received more that 1,000
applications for teaching, while it needed no more than 20 (Filastin [Amman], 30,
August, 1950).
A top administrative staff member who worked with UNRWA from its first days
recollects his memories:
UNRWA had no education system. They (the young educated men of refugees)
contacted me and asked for a tent to establish a school. I told them we can give
them a tent, but we have no money to give them salaries. It was fine with them. They
sat on the ground, they gathered themselves and we recruited students from all
ages. We would contact the parents, people would know about any development so
quickly, everybody knew about the availability of education. After that we wanted to
guarantee commitment from the volunteering teachers. Even though I have to say, I
saw nothing from them but enthusiasm and commitment, we decided to pay them in
kind (give them 60 kg bag of flour). By the time UNRWA started paying the
teachers, we had 30 teachers in one school.
- In September 1951, a letter to UNRWA appeared in the newspaper. The title of
the letter was The Importance of UNRWA Taking Care of Educating the Refugees
Children: We do not want to see our kids in the alleyways and streets but in classrooms:
Nobody denies the role of the Social Services Department for which it should be
thanked. However, we would like to ask what has the department prepared for the
coming academic year...May be one of the main duties of the department is to
increase the number of teachers especially that hundreds of youngsters who have
applied for jobs. Groups of teachers are leaving the country day after day while our
children are gaining no education. UNRWA should be capable of employing those
(teachers), not because they need work, but because it is the UNRWA's duty to
educate the refugees. It has appointed itself in charge of their housing, food, health
and education (Filastin [Amman], 20, September, 1951).
- In 1951, the Annual Report admits the following:
Another unforeseen difficulty was the opposition of the refugees themselves. This
hostility to all works undertaken by the Agency was based upon their conviction
that to accept employment within the host countries would be tantamount to
renouncing the right to return home, and perhaps even the right to compensation.
This suspicion was not so widespread in Jordan, where the works programme was
in fact the most successful, but for over six months it was very strong in both Syria
and Lebanon.
Not only was it difficult to recruit sufficient workers, but demonstrations and threats
to Agency personnel were made and, even, once on the job, some of the workers
displayed, on occasion, an unwilling approach which greatly reduced output.
However, in many places this attitude gradually changed; at some sites, requests
for employment greatly exceeded the financial possibilities, and when work finally
stopped, towards the middle of 1951, there was strong opposition to the closedown
(UNRWA Annual Report 1951, para 44).
CHAPTER SIX: WHO WERE THE PLANNERS IN UNRWA?
The multiplicity of practices teaches us that small can be beautiful, terrible, and
extremely complex (Schvarzer 1987).
The following chapter examines the role of different planners in UNRWA. It
challenges the mythical construct of UNRWA as an insulated, top-down planner who acts
upon its passive subjects. It proves that the barriers between UNRWA as a planning
agency, and the refugees, as planned for, did not exist robustly. As such, this chapter
suggests that the refugees were planners themselves who worked inside the agency or
organized themselves to take certain actions towards the agency. The chapter examines
circumstances for creating refugees as planners and strategies they adopted in the
planning process. The chapter introduces the international staff members, planners from
the refugees including local staff members (top administrative staff and street level
bureaucrats), and community planners.
a) International Staff Members
Due to the lack of information, this section of the study does not intend to assess the
performance of the international staff members. Rather, it aims at placing the
international staff members in relation to the organization, the body of refugees, and the
international relations. This will help us understand the dynamics between the "agency"
and the refugees in the upcoming sections of the chapter.
Benjamin Schiff correctly argues that since its early days, UNRWA has looked like
an organization funded by colonial powers and administered by their representatives.
Many of UNRWA's international staff members were affiliated with military forces in
their countries or were experts in rebuilding Europe after World War II by working on
the Marshall Plan as well as American public projects (Schiff 1995).
During the period of study, UNRWA had three directors and two deputy directors.
The three directors were Howard Kennedy (Canadian, May 1950-June 1951), John B.
Blandford (American, July 1951-March 1953), and Henry R. Labouisse (American, June
1954-June 1958). The two deputy directors were James Keen (British, May 1950-Sep
1952) and Leslie J. Carver (British, October 1952-November 1959).
None of the directors or deputy directors was an expert on the Middle East. Blandford
was an expert in post-war housing in the United States, worked with President
Eisenhower in the Treasury Department, and served as a director for the Tennessee
Valley Authority. Henry R. Labouisse was a practicing lawyer in New York and worked
for the Marshall Plan. In the1960s, Labouisse served as the head of the US International
Co-operation Administration, US Ambassador to Greece, and Executive Director of
UNICEF.
The appointment of the directors, deputy directors, and other international staff
members reflected the power that each major donor could exercise over UNRWA. The
more a donor country contributed to UNRWA's budget, the more power it would have to
employ its citizens in UNRWA. The top international staff members in this period were
Americans, Britons, or Canadians, usually with diplomatic background. Out of the twelve
commissioner-generals (formerly directors) that the General Assembly has named, six
have been Americans. The United States has always been the major donor for UNRWA.
Working with UNRWA offered significant advantages for many international staff
members. They had senior posts and gained work experience in a growing region. Most
international staff members were placed in UNRWA's headquarters in Beirut, which was
known as the Switzerland of the Arab World. Beirut combined the heritage of the East
with the modernity of the West.
Working with UNRWA, however, had financial pitfalls. Despite their high salaries,
the conditions of international staff members' employment did not compare favorably
with other UN agencies. For example, it was not until 1961 that UNRWA participated in
the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund. This situation made it harder to recruit and
retain international staff members at times (Buehrig 1971).
International staff members occupied the most senior posts in the agency. Each field
office would typically have 5-7 international employees. The headquarters in Beirut
would usually have 75-120 international employees. Experts from health and education
were drawn from UNESCO and WHO. It was believed that the work of the international
staff members was of utmost importance for UNRWA. They were experienced and
qualified enough to maintain the integrity of the organization and to set the bar high for
management standards. It was also believed that they were the ones who would be able to
intervene with the Jordanian government when locals failed to do so.
The history of the international staff members was not hidden from the refugees. The
higher the ranking of the international staff member, the better known his personal
history was to the refugees. For example, after the nomination of Blandford as a Director,
a newspaper article was published entitled: Who is Blandford, UNRWA's New Director.
The article discussed Blandford's previous work experience. Blandford's experience in
public housing and the Tennessee Valley Authority added to the refugees' suspicions
about the agency's attempts to resettle them. The hostility towards Blandford continued
through his 20-month term of service. The reasons for Blandford's eventual resignation
are unclear to me, as to whether it had anything to do with the hostility of the refugees
towards him. A refugee mukhtar who had finished his primary education in the 1940s
recollects his memories about Blandford:
Unfortunately, UNRWA was very much political and we had clashes with it and we
protested it. In 1950s UNRWA had Blandford's projects; Blandford was an
American who made housing projects for the refugees to get them resettled. We
opposed this and told them that we need to be back home.
On the other hand, many refugees and senior staff members interviewed showed deep
appreciation to both Henry R. Labouisse and John Davis. A refugee notable, after
showing suspicion towards Blandford and criticizing his resettlement projects, praised
Labouisse:
Mr. Henry Labouisse came as a Director in 1953. He was very good person:
helpful for the plight of the Palestinians and appreciative for their hardship. He
was affected by the bad situation in which people live. We highly appreciated and
liked him. After he returned to the US, he advocated for our cause and published a
book about our plight.
As will be argued later, the relationships with the international staff members were a
factor that determined the path the refugees would choose to pursue their plans on many
levels.
b) Refugee Planners
Our understanding of society and the state has undergone revision in recent years
and we have become more aware not only of the 'informal structures' and
'influence versus authority' but also of the 'technologies of power', the 'tactics of
resistance', the 'power of negotiation' and the subversion of dominant categories'.
The formal arena is now shown to be vague and ambiguous and ill-defined as the
private, or perhaps even more so (Shami 1997).
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The next section is a deconstructionist analysis of the "development" or "counter-
development" discourse that the refugees created as a response to UNRWA. Why did the
refugees resist UNRWA? How did they do it? Did their project go beyond rejectionism to
providing alternatives? What knowledge did they have with which to create plans and
how did they implement it? How could the refugees transform their relationship with
UNRWA from a top-down one to a symbiotic and interactive one? First, I examine
conditions for creating refugee planners. Then I analyze the role of the different groups
among those planners. I borrow from Friedmann's concepts about planning as social
mobilization.
Possible Prerequisites for Creating Refueee Plannerss
5 I should admit that this research falls short of addressing gender issues in the planning tradition among
the refugees. As mentioned in the introduction, this is due to unavailability of female refugees for
interviews. However, it should be mentioned that the presence of women , based on newspaper articles
or the interviewees' comments, was minimal if not totally absent. Women may have had other channels for
making an impact, such as networking among themselves or influencing their male relatives. During my
fieldwork, I came across many women who sat for the interviews with their husbands and intervened often
to add a comment, correct some information, or disagree on certain points of view.
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Refugee planners interviewed were mainly males: they suffered the humiliation of
exile. They varied in their age and levels of education. Many of them were illiterate,
while others had finished their Matriculation. The glue that united these refugees was an
unjust experience that they lived and that became part of the history that drove their life
in exile. "Refugeeness" became a social identity that shaped a clear vision about their
future. Refugees did not belong to political parties at the time despite the fact that politics
dominated their lives. Refugee planners had no vanguard and no institutional
representative. However, they might have four distinctions that helped them to become
planners: experience in political participation, human capital with expertise in education,
commitment to achieving a unified goal, and local understanding for the social, cultural,
and economic landscapes among the refugee communities.
a) Consciousness and Political Participation:
As discussed in the first chapter, refugees had expertise in political resistance and
civil disobedience. Community participation in political organization was part of the
daily life in Palestine that might have put the refugees on this distinctively participatory
path. Refugees had unique knowledge that helped them to understand the particularity of
their problem, and to place it in the wider regional and international context. They
understood the history and politics of the Middle East, Zionism, and colonialism given
that politics was inseparable from the daily life in Palestine. The British Mandate had
nurtured this tendency by imposing harsh economic and administrative measures on
Palestinians and also through promises for creating a national home for the Jews in
Palestine. Khalidi highlights the importance of the peasants' role in resisting land sales to
Zionist groups after 1900. He cites an accident in which peasants molested the Jewish
Colonization Association's surveyor when he came to measure the land of sale in 1901
(Khalidi 1997). Khalidi also cites the Sursuq family story. In 1910, the family owned
more than 230,000 dunams in Palestine and decided to sell its properties to the Jewish
National Fund. The peasants in these lands resisted displacement and dispossession. They
showed armed resistance that Khalidi considers to be the grassroots for the Palestinian
resistance in 1930s and later in 1960s (Khalidi 1997).
Khalidi argues that there was a strong interaction between Palestinian urban
opposition and rural resistance to Zionism. Both groups made a conscious effort to resist
Zionism and both shared a sense of destiny. For example, the editors of the anti-Zionist
newspaper Filastin distributed it to every village in Jaffa, which was a major target for
Zionist settlers (Khalidi 1997).
In 1935, 'Iz al-Din al-Qassam, a renowned figure in the rural resistance, was killed in
combat with the British forces. Al-Qassam's funeral turned into a public demonstration
for both rural and the urban residents. The funeral "electrified" the 1936-39 revolt, which
had a fatal impact on the daily life of every Palestinian: the revolt crippled the economy
and killed and wounded thousands. Many refugees participated in 1936 and in other
revolts. When they left, refugees carried with them this rigorous memory of political
activism on many levels to the host societies (Khalidi 1997).
Daniel Lerner, in his book The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the
Middle East (1958) conducted a study of Jordan. He notes the following:
But if the refugees have not raised economic supply, they have significantly
increased political demands. Demands for accountability are growing in a society
which hitherto provided no channels for popular participation. A poor, illiterate
farmer- who has learned to listen to international broadcasts-told his interviewer
about Jordan's great national problems: We do not have good roads, modern
machines for agriculture, doctors, clinics and clean water (Lerner 1958, 307).
Lerner found that on media behavior in Jordan, 65% of the refugees scored high on
the Exposure Index, compared to 50% of the non-refugees. The index is based on the
frequency of newspaper reading, radio listening, and movie going. He notes that some
refugee camps were equipped with loudspeakers for communal listening. Also, he found
that 23 of 29 Palestinians interviewed in Jordan read the New York Times, Time
Magazine, Ladies Home Journal, Colliers, and Vogue (Lerner 1958).
These facts about the participation of the peasants and refugees in the political life in
Palestine and Jordan challenges the assumption that intensive forms of political
participation tend to exclude the less privileged sectors of a society (Fung 2003). This
assumption is justified by a lack of the time due to long working hours and a lack of
communication skills that would allow them to articulate their points of view in the
public or semi-public arenas. Fung debunks this assumption. He argues that while most
explanations of participation focus on the supply side of the account, there is a need to
look at the demand side. In other words, there is a need to analyze motives that would
encourage or discourage individuals from participating in the decision-making process
(Fung 2003).
b) Expertise in Education
Expertise in education shaped the infrastructure of teachers and school principals
who started the educational system in UNRWA. The qualitative and quantitative
flourishing of education in Palestine before 1948 furnished a way for establishing a good
educational system after exile. As discussed in chapter two, the educational system in
Palestine expanded after 1943. By the end of the British Mandate, every major town had
a complete public school preparing for the General Secondary Examination, while other
towns had secondary classes, as did many private Muslim and Christian schools, in towns
and in villages. In 1944, 78 students received the Arabic Matriculation, 35 the English
Matriculation, 46 the Arab School Certificate, and 25 the English School Certificate.
Many other well-educated students took the exam but did not pass.
c) Sharing a Common Goal:
Refugee planners had primary and secondary goals. Their primary and macro goal
was the ability to exercise the Right of Return. This was in conflict with UNRWA's
integration and economic development projects. Refugee planners' secondary and micro
goals related to an efficient, effective, and equitable system that delivered daily life
necessities: nutrition and health services equal to international standards, a temporary
housing system that protected them from winter storms, and education to carry when they
move from the host country. They sought to sustain standards for these daily life
necessities while at the same time making sure that UNRWA, rather than the host
government, provided these necessities, thus affirming their temporary status as refugees.
For example, refugees demanded the right to decent "shelter" inside the camps. On the
other hand, they resisted ownership of housing projects outside the camps.
d) Local knowledge and Collective Learning:
Refugee planners understood the socio-cultural dynamics of their community and
possible divisions among its members, including regional, religious, or class structures.
They also had knowledge about UNRWA's mandate and constitutional origins. Over
time, they gained more knowledge by dealing with the agency. Baiocchi highlights the
importance of the process of collective learning in establishing bonds between the
stakeholders and citizens (Fung and Wright 2003). His study of Porto Alegre shows that
participatory governance empowered the civil society and fostered interconnection
between its members. He found that "associational density" had almost doubled. The
collective learning process allowed for such a change among the refugees. In the camps
we could find YMCA, cultural and sport clubs, and women groups.
Planning with UNRWA
In order to achieve their goals, refugee planners adopted an eclectic approach-utopian
at times and social anarchist at others6 . I suggest that refugees were utopians when it
related to their Right of Return. They based their argument on the moral values in which
they believed. Their goal was inclusive for all refugees, and they viewed it as a public
good that refugees should be able to enjoy. It was an all-or-nothing value that they
adopted. While they could clearly articulate the first part of the primary goal-the "right"
and on the injustice imposed on them-they did not have a clear understanding of the
second part" -the "return" and the mechanisms needed to achieve it.
6 Utopianism is based on rejecting the current system and suggesting a new system that may question the
fundamental values the time and place. (Manuel and Manuel, 1979), while social anarchists base their
ideology on the absence of state or central authority.
Refugees were social anarchists at other times, as they sought to minimize the role of
institutional intervention in their lives despite being desperately in need of help. I suggest
that they rejected the institutional intervention out of a general rejection for centralized
power, as well as a rejection of institutions to which they did not belong. These
institutions were not Palestinian or British, but Israeli, Jordanian, or international.
Refugees did not trust institutions, many of which were products of the colonial power,
which had oppressed Palestinians at an earlier stage and helped to displace them at a later
one. After exile, there was a strong sense of bitterness and humiliation that made the
refugees prone to anger and suspicion toward anything that could have helped their plight
during the war or after displacement, including nation-states and the UN. These
institutions had no roots in the refugees' culture. A refugee who talked positively about a
housing project that a church built for his clan after their exile explains the situation:
Refugee: A church built us houses and resettled us in the West Bank.
Researcher: But this was resettlement, just like UNRWA did?
Refugee: No, it was not. We knew the church and we trusted it. We didn't know
UNRWA; neither did we trust it. Actually, UNRWA was a product of the imperial
powers to control us.
However, refugee planners learned from experience that these institutions could be
of value for their communities and started building alliances with them, seizing on
available opportunities to reach their goals. They started appreciating efficiency,
effectiveness, and equity when micromanaging public goods. They also started realizing
the externalities that each group of refugees could impose on others.
I suggest that the process of collective learning by dealing with UNRWA added to
the "collective identity" of the refugees. Melucci defines collective identity as "an
interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals and concerned with the
orientations of action and the fields of opportunities and constraints in which the action
takes place". He argues that "collective action is submerged in everyday life as a result of
a personal commitment. Collective actions form networks that offer alternative
frameworks of meaning, each of which challenge the dominant discourse." Melucci also
suggests that a movement is a "network of small groups submerged in everyday life
which requires a personal involvement in experiencing and practicing cultural
innovation" (Melucci 1988).
In this sense, society becomes a place for a planning process. It becomes a product
of encounters with the "other" that results, as Escobar argues, in intensifying "awareness
of our own culture and makes us realize how we think and feel in some ways rather than
others, that is, that we have a culture" (Escobar 1992).
The significance of this case comes from its occurrence at a time when planning
was only accredited to the professional planners, affiliated with elite institutions, who
adopted approaches that were "apolitical", ahistorical, and abstract (Friedmann 1987).
This research acknowledges social mobilization and organization7 as essential
forms of planning. By doing so, it highlights an access to power that the masses have, a
hypothesis that negates the stereotype of passive recipients of services delivered by elite
institutions. Refugee planners were able to reach transformative action after criticizing
the present conditions imposed on them and proposing other alternatives. This case is one
7 Unlike Friedmann, who gave credit to social mobilization, I suggest that the case study should be
accurately called social organization. Charles Payne distinguishes between mobilization and organization.
Mobilization refers to the process through which inspirational leaders and persuaders get the masses to join
in an action. On the other hand, organization refers to sustainable process and deep understanding for the
movement's goals and aspirations (Payne, 1995)
in which the momentum for planning comes from within the community itself. A synergy
between the socio-political mobilization and institutional intervention was the driving
factor. The case study presented in this research took place many years before the
literature on social movements and their relation to planning appeared, starting with
Grabow and Heskin's article in 1973 (Friedmann 1987).
In the next section I analyze the refugee's role in the planning process. I look at
planners among UNRWA's local staff members of top administrative seniors and street-
level bureaucrats. I also look at refugees who did not work with UNRWA but have had
an critical role in the planning process. I call those refugees community planners. Finally,
I try to analyze the emergence of a refugee group that refused to go through the planning
process.
a) Local Staff Members of Refugees
For work to be an organizing principle of a decent society, it must be meaningful,
and for it to be meaningful it must either be embedded in a system of values which
give work a final, as distinct from an instrumental, purpose, or the worker's
knowledge must be accorded sufficient respect to give the worker the cultural
space to create his own meaning out of his labour (Apffel-Marglin 1990).
I suggest that a body of refugees had penetrated the agency's institutional body to the
extent that the absolute barriers between UNRWA and the refugees might been extremely
weakened. Refugee staff members in UNRWA found a fine line between acting like
clients driven by personal and communal needs on one hand and acting like staff
members of an international agency with well established rules and regulations on the
other. I question the relation between the official and unofficial- the legal and illegal.
Local staff members, even though they worked under the supervision of internationals,
had their own informal power that official records did not acknowledge. This informal
power was recognized by the refugees as well as by the internationals. It was manifested
in their ability to negotiate public goods with the refugees from one side and with the
agency from the other. It was also manifested by their ability to negotiate with the agency
their own rights as staff members. Locals also enjoyed a wide space for discretion that
UNRWA's formal constitution did not recognize.
The UN recognizes professionalism as the sole judge in which the legal and the
illegal are two poles with clear dividing lines that could not be crossed by its staff
members or refugees. However, interviews showed that the behavior of staff members
and refugees was regulated by unofficial criteria that resulted from an interaction and
understanding for what is legal. It was through this understanding that the local staff
members were able to maintain their positions, help the refugees make rational requests,
and help the agency moderate its expectations. In this case, the personal and the
professional were not two poles but overlapping spheres. Both the political and the social
could be looked at as personal at times and as professional at others.
In 1953, UNRWA's staff posts exceeded 6,000, which made it the largest
transnational employer in the Middle East. International staff members occupied fewer
than 140 posts, while local employees, mostly refugees, occupied the rest (Filastin
[Amman], 21, February, 1953). In this respect, UNRWA differed greatly from other
operational UN agencies at the time, such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration (UNRRA). The latter had more than 24,000 staff posts within three years
of its establishment, of which 13,000 were occupied by internationals (Buehrig 1971).
UNRWA local staff members were refugees themselves. Many of them came from
Palestinian towns where they had been educated and had work experience with the
British Mandate, AFSC, or ICRC. Many were also bi-lingual and had a certain level of
administrative skills.
Working with UNRWA was a great financial advantage for local staff members. Like
the rest of the refugees, they had been deprived of their belongings and fled into a poor
country where they could not find jobs despite their qualifications. Not only did UNRWA
offer them jobs, but its salary scale was higher than that of the host government's. One
pitfall of working with UNRWA was its temporary character, which was always a threat
to job security. However, local staff members knew that if UNRWA ceased to exist, it
would mean that their Right of Return had been achieved. The end of UNRWA would be
an end to their status of "refugeeness".
Working with UNRWA proved to have advantages that went beyond financial ones.
Local staff members acquired administrative skills, were exposed to the western
standards of professionalism, and found an avenue to help their community of refugees in
the host society. Their people perceived them as holding the hopes for meeting their
collective and individual expectations.
A gap between institutional orders and the performance of the staff members was not
necessarily due to misunderstanding or miscommunication. Rather it was due to
disagreement between the two parties on means and ends. Local staff members did not
always share the objectives of their supervisors.
However, UNRWA local staff members went through a process of collective learning
to find rational estimations for the role of their agency and the solution for their
problems. They struggled to change the conditions imposed on their people by the
agency. It became clear that their abilities might stretch beyond serving a social cause
toward serving a national cause through advocating the refugees' Right of Return. They
realized that individual behavior, when aggregated, could shape the mandate of an
institution and have a great impact on people's lives, especially when their clients came
from the most deprived groups of their own society and their coworkers shared the same
goals and social background.
1. Top-level Administrative Staff Members of Refugees
Commissioner-generals consulted them, Palestinian communities respected them,
younger staff looked at them as mentors. A few of them acquired the sobriquet
"uncrowned kings" of UNRWA (Schiff 1995).
Senior local staff members realized the importance of their role in the organization's
structure. Through political savvy with both the international staff members and the
refugees, senior local staff members were able to fill a huge gap between the two parties.
Senior local staff members had their own views about the internationals that they
formulated through direct interaction. Unexpectedly, they did not appreciate their
international supervisors necessarily for professional reasons, but for personal, social, and
political ones. Both groups interacted with each other extensively at social events. The
gatherings of their wives became informal forums for exchanging views (Schiff 1995).
Many of the locals appreciated the cultural background of the internationals. They also
saw their international supervisors as potential allies for the Palestinians during their stay
in Jordan and after they returned to their countries. a local staff member shared his
experience:
Most of them would come with an orientalist vision about the Palestinians, not
understanding their plight and the injustice imposed on them. But with time, many
of them became sympathetic. They would see the human side of the Palestinians and
they would see the great injustice they suffer from. Many of them would turn into
advocates for the Palestinian refugees in the West. John Davis was a great Director
and he tried to publish a book about the subject in the United States. Yet, the book
could not find its way to a publisher and he had to go to Europe to find one .
However, we were suspicious of a few of the international staff members. We
suspected that one of them was working with British intelligence.
Senior local staff members also interacted with the refugees. Not only did they
understand the injustice imposed on their clients, but they suffered it as well. All of them
had been deprived of all their belongings, forcefully left their homes, and received
humanitarian assistance, and many of them lived in the camps. They shared a cultural
background with the refugees. They also were believers in the Right of Return and
opposed settlement projects.
Senior local staff members were the locals who were really able to see the big picture
and to wear the hats of many stakeholders at the same time. They had the dual role of
serving their social and national affiliation on one hand and their institutional one on the
other. At the same time, they enjoyed some credibility by making it clear to their
communities that their institutional power was limited, and to their international
supervisors that their social power was limited:
The top level Palestinian employees imbibe the agency's administrative culture,
needing to comprehend and apply western notions of professionalism and
objectivity to succeed. But theirs is a more complex calculus than the
internationals'. They must grasp the internationals' perceptual frameworks and
consequent positions, learn to apply the internationals' criteria for making their
own decisions, but also gauge their communities' perceptions of UNRWA and host
governments' attitudes. They develop independent convictions about what UNRWA
8 In 1968 John Davis published the Evasive Peace, John Murray, London. The book not only underwent six
printings, but was translated into German, Finnish, Polish and Arabic.
actions or positions would be best for the Palestinians and for the agency (Schiff
1995, 148).
Tensions and even clashes between senior locals and internationals were frequent for
many reasons. Certain moments proved that what each staff member represented was one
of the two poles: the donor western powers or the powerless, needy refugees. Many locals
expressed their dissatisfaction about training international staff members, only to let them
become supervisors the next day:
We understood the idea of a salary scale, but it was unfair. We would complain
about this formally and informally.
Senior local staff members were keen to deliver their complaints to the press and to
the refugees. In 1950, the General Committee of the Refugees from Jalil and Jaffa wrote
a letter to the Minister of the Refugees and Construction complaining about the high
salaries of UNRWA internationals. The letter mentioned that these salaries were paid
from funds that were supposed to help the refugees. It pointed out that the internationals'
high salaries contrasted sharply with the locals'. The letter also mentioned that an
international nurse named Ms. Robertson was paid a base salary of JD180 and a bonus of
JD120. The committee suggested replacing Ms. Roberson by a number of local nurses
who would be paid much less. By this, better health services could be provided to the
needy refugees. The letter immediately found its way to the Jordanian press, and the local
staff, supported by the refugees, created a scandal for UNRWA (Filastin [Amman], 19,
September, 1950).
In 1951, a newspaper article cited a paper that Dorothy Thompson, a renowned
journalist from New York, had presented to the General Assembly. Thompson was a
freelancer who visited the refugees in the host countries. Thompson considered UNRWA
to be a form of colonialism and strongly criticized the high salaries that UNRWA paid its
international staff members. Thompson also mentioned that the refugees showed hatred
and hostility towards UNRWA (Filastin [Amman], 5, January, 1951).
Another source of tension between the internationals and the locals was politics,
about which internationals were very cautious. Internationals either did not fully
appreciate the injustice imposed on the refugee, or did not want to show their full belief.
On the other hand, locals were very keen to express their dissatisfaction with the political
situation. Locals were not supposed to work in politics. This would be in a conflict with
the terms of appointment. Yet, the term "politics" was not a well-defined and staff
members could go around it depending on their position and courage.
A former senior UNRWA staff member recalls his memories from 1950s. A group of
UNRWA local staff members, mostly senior-level and working in education, wanted to
show appreciation for their international supervisor by giving him a gift. However, the
gift was an honorary shield showing a Palestinian in traditional shawl and a gun. This
angered the international supervisor, who rejected the gift because he saw it as politically
inflammatory. However, the locals did not dispose of the gift. On the contrary, they
circulated it among themselves, and it ended up in an office of a senior local staff
member. This is a moderate case where locals neither opposed their international
supervisor, nor disposed of their politics.
However, clashes were not moderate all the time. UNRWA's Director visited a
school in Amman in the 1970s, where he saw a painting of a Palestinian man with a gun.
The Director asked for the piece to be removed because he saw it as inappropriate for the
UN school. The local senior staff member rejected the stand and insisted that it was a
right for Palestinians to express themselves and their national struggle:
UNRWA staff member: I told him; this is a Palestinian school, you can not omit
their feelings. I insisted not to send a letter of warning to the teacher.
Researcher: Was this allowed? Were not you forbidden from working in politics?
UNRWA staff member: We had to sign a contract in which we agreed not to work
in politics. We were prohibited from talking to journalists. From the refugees' point
of view, my feeling towards Palestine is not political, this is personal. The
Palestinian who was working with UNRWA is an exiled Palestinian first and
UNRWA employee second. I myself can't go to a teacher and ask her not to teach
the students what is the land of historical Palestine. Nobody could do this. The
political for them was personal for us.
Researcher: But would not you be scared of the consequences?
UNRWA staff member: Let UNRWA believe in what it wants to believe. What is
UNRWA? It's the local staff. Nobody could prevent me from saying that I was
exiled. If you come from the UK or the US and believe that this is politics, this is up
to you, why should I care? There were only a few of them. How could they trace
what is going on? They could not. Many of them were sympathetic and just ignored
what we were doing. Others were not sympathetic but really could not do much.
There were only a few of them.
Researcher: Is it true that you would contact the media about projects that they
didn't like?
UNRWA staff member: Of course this was the situation, why should not they have!
Despite the fact that the interview took place five decades after this event occurred,
the story shows clearly the strong stand that the senior staff member started to take. After
a few years of serving in the agency, senior local staff started accumulating power and
increasingly started criticizing the agency's political stand without fear:
"You could take all the internationals out of the agency and it would still run-but it
wouldn't be an international organization anymore, " said one international. Many
locals agree (Schiff 1995, 148).
2. Street-Level Bureaucrats
Analyzing street level bureaucrats' role in UNRWA's mandate is of paramount
importance. At one level, street level bureaucrats formed the largest body of UNRWA
staff members. Their salaries had the lion's share of UNRWA's budget. Street-level
bureaucrats also grew drastically in numbers started forming their own unions in 1957.
They provided direct public services at times (teachers) and mediated between the agency
and its clients at others (census takers).
At a more complex level, street level bureaucrats had a significant role in the agency.
Michael Lipsky argues that the decisions of street level bureaucrats and the devices they
create to cope with uncertainties and limitations of their work become the public policies
of the institutions (Lipsky 1980). Most street level bureaucrats were refugees themselves.
They came from villages and lived in refugee camps. They interacted with the refugees
on a daily basis as family members, neighbors, and victims of the same injustice. Once
they started working with UNRWA, street level bureaucrats lost their UNRWA ration
cards that united them with the rest of the refugees. However, they could maintain strong
relations with the refugees through wearing two different hats at a time: planner and
beneficiary.
Despite the fact that a large portion of UNRWA's mandate was shaped by
institutional elites, street level bureaucrats were usually free of supervisors in the field.
Street level bureaucrats were the screen through which the refugees encountered
UNRWA on a daily basis. While it is true that street level bureaucrats were restricted by
UNRWA's rules and regulations, their supervisors' orders, and dynamics inside their
group, they were also restrained by their socio-cultural ties, daily life necessities of the
refugees, and their political aims. Many of these complexities were not recognized by
UNRWA's mandate. In many cases, street level bureaucrats had to make decisions on the
spot. In these instances, refugee clients might have acted like supervisors rather than
beneficiaries.
Street level bureaucrats had both redistribution and allocation roles. They had room
for discretion in determining the nature and amount of services provided to the
beneficiaries. Discretion enabled street level bureaucrats to be key holders to important
aspects of the refugees' daily life, which caused a form of social control over their fellow
refugees. They had to deal with their clients' personal and immediate reactions.
Interviewees report that at the time of UNRWA's first operations, street level
bureaucrats looked at UNRWA as an employer with an upper hand and at themselves as
employees with clear orders to implement. They realized that they did not have as much
bargaining leverage as other senior staff members of administrators did. Having minimal
professional qualifications, they understood well that if they got into a clash with the
agency without support from the local administrators, they could be easily replaced. If
they tried to hurt UNRWA, their communities would be the first to suffer once the
agency ceased to exist. This is one reason why they did not protest the agency's mandate
through uncooperative strategies such as striking, aggressive tactics such as stealing or
apathetic attitudes towards their work (Lipsky 1980). They did not practice such
techniques because they wanted to act in their full capacity and increase UNRWA's
ability to deliver services to the refugees. Teachers, nurses, and doctors were working day
and night. Many interviewees mentioned that teachers were teaching many classes -
sometimes until 2:00 AM--using a lamp they put in the street to gather students. Street-
level bureaucrats regarded the standards of western professionalism as a target to be hit,
but this did not last very long.
The passage of time proved to these street level bureaucrats that UNRWA was not the
isolated or utopian international, professional, or humanitarian agency they thought it
would be. There were only a few international staff members with a limited power of
surveillance and control. Internationals were not necessarily the ideal administrators, as
they were portrayed to the refugees. Many internationals had good professional
reputations, but others were known for corruption or incompetence. Time also showed to
street level bureaucrats that UNRWA's main goals were not humanitarian. Rather, they
started realizing the political controversy about UNRWA and the agenda that donor
countries might be seeking to implement through it. All of these factors made street level
bureaucrats realize the need to combine professionalism with advocacy. They realized
that they were on the same page with local administrators as well as with the refugees.
A UNRWA staff member recalls his memories about early 1950s in an interview.
UNRWA advertised an administrative job related to a housing project that it was
planning to undertake. UNRWA needed a customer service representative for the
refugees wishing to apply for the program. The refugee mentioned that he took the job.
He also made sure that he recorded the names of the applicants to pass to his friend. The
friend used use his refugee networks to discourage the applicants from applying to the
settlement project, sometimes by positive or other times by negative pressure.
Street-level bureaucrats did not interact with the internationals except occasionally.
As such, they looked at them as western supervisors representing western powers that had
helped create the refugee problem. Unlike many senior staff members, a school teacher
expressed his sentiment saying:
Many of them knew Arabic very well but pretended not to understand us, they
disrespected us and our culture, they had the power and money and we had
nothing.
b) Community Planners
In order to achieve their goals, community planners had a complex palate of
strategies that resembled those Friedmann uses when analyzing social mobilization.
These included spontaneous uprisings, forming local action groups, networking, and
building alliances (Friedmann 1987).
First, community planners had spontaneous uprisings in the form of mass strikes.
Spontaneous uprisings seemed to emerge from each camp on its own, without
coordination between different camps. Refugees would participate across lines of gender,
age, education, and area of origin. Those who refused to participate in uprisings would
suffer from social exclusion. In the early 1950s, strikes asking for the Right of Return,
resisting integration projects, and condemning UNRWA's imperialism took place on a
larger scale. However, after the collective learning process, refugees became more
pragmatic, asking to improve the standards of food, education, housing, and health.
Strikes had a symbolic value for the refugees. First, they assured social cohesion
when demanding public goods rather than competition for resources. Second, they
empowered the refugees with a sense of ability to bring about a change and to have
access to power. In this case, the upper hand was not necessarily the state's or
UNRWA's, but possibly the refugees'.
Despite the fact that refugees generally did not adopt violence in their strikes, fear
of violence was a driving factor for the elite institutions to meet their demands. Fear of
violence was highest where there were huge agglomerations of refugees, mainly in
camps. As a senior government official at the time explained, the government feared
losing control over the destructive bitterness of crowds of refugees. Neither the
government nor UNRWA had a way to meet demands about the Right of Return. The
institutions were concerned about restoring order and preventing violence rather than
synthesizing the refugees' demands in a wider context.
Strikes were more important at an early stage when bitterness among the refugees
was extreme, and the journey of exile was still fresh. Strikes and demonstrations
resembled an early stage of the planning process that required spreading awareness and
mobilization. They also led to forming local action groups.
Second, refugees had local action groups informally organized to be a nucleus for
wider movements. An example was the camp committee. Each camp had its own
committee that consisted of mukhtars ("elected" village leaders), who represented a
group of clans that came from one village. Mukhtars enjoyed many skills: a high level of
leadership among their communities, first-hand knowledge of the local situation of their
camp/clan, strong personal interactions to guarantee commitment from the refugees, high
level of rationality when talking to their communities, ability to coordinate with other
local action groups in other camps, and flexibility depending on opportunities and
constraints. Not all mukhtars were trusted by refugees, as some of them were accused of
working for their personal interests without taking into consideration the public interest
of the refugees. However, these self-serving mukhtars were well-known enough to be
avoided by the refugees.
At first, camp committees worked as representatives for the refugees in a flexible
fashion depending on demands and needs. However, at a later stage, they became more
bureaucratized, and the officially elected camp committees had an important role in
representing the refugees during decision-making processes inside UNRWA's meetings.
The camp committees stabilized the arrangements politically by operating as watchdogs
of public accountability and holding officials responsible for the implementation and
development of projects. Confidentially and publicly, camp committees criticized
UNRWA for not meeting the refugees' needs in nutrition, health, housing, and education.
They continued mobilizing the refugees in their camps and building civic capacity by
furthering awareness with group discussions, meetings, and individual conversations.
Another local action group was volunteer teachers and principals. These were
young educated Palestinians who valued education as a way to build human capital,
which was the only sustainable asset for the refugees. Refugee teachers also recognized
the danger of losing refugee children if time was not invested wisely. The gatherings of
refugee children in the alleys of the camps, with difficult living conditions, could assure
the rise of the crime and juvenile problems. These teachers and principals informally
formed classes, contacted parents to recruit refugee children, and divided them among
classes. At a later stage, when education was formalized by UNRWA, these teachers had
their roles in mobilizing students and educating them about their problem and the utopian
solution of the Right of Return. Educational curriculum followed the Jordanian one, yet
the teachers made sure that they taught the refugee children about the uniqueness of their
cause.
Third, refugees had their internal and spontaneous networks. These networks were
voluntarily established, had easy conditions of entry and exit, demanded minimal level of
individual or collective commitment and coordination, and were mostly based on spatial
divisions for shelters. The networks acted mainly through sharing stories and news. This
strategy was best exemplified by gatherings of men in the coffee shops in the camps
where they would exchange news and share stories. Sources of news varied: a radio that
would be centralized in the coffee shop where everybody would be listening carefully,
the educated youngsters who would have an access to Jordanian newspapers, or refugees
working in the city and interacting with non-refugee groups. Among these were bus
drivers riding between Amman and the camps and hearing all the stories from the
passengers then sharing at the end of the day with their network of refugees in the coffee
shops. Coffee shops continued to play an important role during the course of the study.
The coffee shop could be observed as a continuation of the guest house in the
village. The major commonality among the two was the flow of information that related
to the wider context, especially the political one. However, the guesthouse was an
exclusive and hierarchical space dominated by the mukhtar and the village elders, while
coffee shops were spontaneous, inclusive, and democratic spaces. Rosemary Sayigh in
her book Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries notes that the age difference
dissolved in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, a condition unique to the Arab
society. The new generation saw the old one as defeated and ineffective and held them
responsible for the disaster (Sayigh 1978).
Fourth, building coalitions was a common practice among community planners.
These coalitions cut across many divisions and rivers: villages of origin in the same
camp, national institutions represented by the Jordanian government, and international
ones like the UN. Coalition builders were full-time leaders committed to their community
but well connected with other external institutions. Mukhtars from different camps had
periodic meetings and they had a list of contact information for each other to use in cases
of emergencies.
Different levels of coalitions achieved different objectives simultaneously. Through
coalitions with refugees from other camps, refugees could exert stronger pressure on
UNRWA to meet their daily demands, especially when it related to issues that all
refugees could be concerned about. Through the Jordanian government, refugee planners
could arrange for their daily needs through appeals, complains, delegations, and
mobilization to support certain programs or block others. Through the General Assembly
they could arrange for their Right of Return.
National coalitions aimed at changing the mandate of the agency and
simultaneously serving the daily needs of the refugees. When building national
coalitions, the planners were refugees who were well educated, well connected with
national institutions even if illiterate, or UNRWA local executive staff members who saw
in their jobs an opportunity to channel the agency's mandate. National coalitions created
pressure exercised mainly through the Jordanian government or through UNRWA local
staff members.
International coalitions were created by educated Palestinians who were well-
connected internationally and by the refugees with the help of the former. The emphasis
was on the Right of Return and rejecting resettlement projects without paying much
emphasis to daily logistics. International coalitions were also exemplified by letters that
the refugees sent to the General Assembly or published in the international press. The
target audiences at the international level were international political powers: the UN, the
US, and the UK.
This division between the levels of coalitions was not structural; there were no clear
boundaries between its different forms. A community planner would operate at many
levels depending on the particularity of the situation. Moreover, forms of coalition
building were sequential, and many times started at the local and then extended to the
international. The ultimate goal that united the three of them was the refugees' desire to
return home. However, time proved to them the importance of lobbying for the
development projects in their communities as they saw appropriate.
A former senior UNRWA staff member has strong memories about local and
international coalitions. He hosted an American senator who visited the refugee camps
and witnessed the brutal living conditions from which the refugees suffered. The staff
member made sure that the senator met the most articulate of the refugees, an old
mukhtar who was illiterate, but with very strong communication skills. The staff member
moderated the interaction between the senator and the mukhtar through translation.
Before ending his visit, the senator showed deep sympathies towards the refugees,
assured their Right of Return, and promised to help them once he was back in the US.
However, the senator didn't keep his promises. The UNRWA staff member knew about a
statement that the senator made after his visit to the Middle East, in which he did not
show the promised sympathy to the refugees. The UNRWA staff member used his
knowledge for an immediate action. He wrote a letter in Arabic and in English to the
senator showing the refugees' disappointment after reading the senator's remarks. Yet,
the staff member was not allowed to get engaged in "politics." In order to avoid the trap,
and to give legitimacy to his letter, the staff member read it for the refugee and asked him
to sign it. A letter from an illiterate refugee was sent to an American senator blaming him
for not delivering on his promises.
Interviews clearly show that refugees were not divided along the lines of
cooperation or resistance to UNRWA. Rather, they were divided along the lines of
collectivity and sharing the group's continuously changing rules, or individuality.
Refugees exercised social exclusion of those who didn't adhere to their norms of
boycotting UNRWA at times or cooperating with it at others. A mukhtar narrates his
experience:
Mukhtar: I organized a movement to oppose settlement. We used to have peaceful
demonstrations, we wrote on each shelter and each street the names of each village
and town we lost in Palestine, we wrote we will not forget you Jaffa, we will not
forget you Jerusalem.
Researcher: What about those who did not participate in your activities?
Mukhtar: In 1953, we wrote slogans everyone we will not forget our homeland. One
refugee asked not to write on his shelter. We did not. He was boycotted, nobody
wanted to deal within him, the bakery, the grocery. Everybody boycotted him, then
he came and apologizes. No one asked people to do this. It was all spontaneous.
Researcher: But you ended up in shelters rather than tents within a couple of years!
Mukhtar: They didn't try to make the shelters brick, the tents were not stable there
was strong winds that will take the tents away during the night when we were
sleeping who would want for his kids to stay with no shelter during the night, we
had no option but to replace the tents. Who wants to stay in the abandoned area
without a tent? We had the idea of replacing the tents by mud, and Lebanon and
UNRWA helped us. The UNRWA helped us by providing wood only, each one did it
himself with the help of others, there were builders of the refugees helping for
minimal wage. Each one helped each other by preparing the building materials,
people helped each other very much as if in one village.
Social exclusion was also imposed on refugees who benefited from UNRWA
housing projects outside the refugee camps. A few refugees mentioned that housing
projects stopped due to the low demand. They were viewed as a form of settlement. A
refugee in his eighties was sitting in his small convenience store next to one of these
housing projects in Amman. When I asked him for directions to the project, anger was
obvious on his face. "Those we should never talk to took units in these projects", he said.
However, the higher the ranking of the refugee leader, the more understanding he showed
to the people's urgent need to accept UNRWA's projects, even those who seem as
settlement projects:
We tried to boycott settlement projects. But people were going through hardships.
We would understand if someone decided to benefit from UNRWA's loans or
housing projects, even though this was very discouraged.
Indirect social exclusion was also imposed on refugees who chose the absolute
resistance to UNRWA. As a matter of fact, refugee leaders who did not benefit from the
collective learning projects and insisted on resisting UNRWA could not keep the
leadership role for a long time. Leaders of absolute resistance could not meet the
refugees' daily needs. Time had guaranteed that the absolute resistance paradigm
between UNRWA and the refugees was not pragmatic.
Illustrative Case Study: Resistance to rectification process
The following case study is an illustrative example for the paramount importance of
local knowledge and political support for any planning project. It also exhibits the role of
political coalitions that communities can establish with different stakeholders in lobbying
for certain projects or blocking others. Finally, the case portrays the discretion that street
level bureaucrats may exercise away from their supervisors.
The number of Palestinian refugees had been a point of dispute between the Arab
states, Israel, and UNRWA. While the Arabs estimated the number to be around 900,000
to one million, the Israelis estimated it to be 520,000. The Economic Survey Mission
estimated it to be 726,000, a number that was not welcomed nor by the Arabs neither by
the Israelis (Morris 1987).
UNRWA and the refugees did not agree on the number; the former was trying to
reduce it, while the latter was trying to increase it. UNRWA looked at the number as
high, inaccurate, and dubious. UNRWA needed to eliminate as many refugees as possible
from its ration rolls. Being able to do so is a measure for its success, since it was
supposed to end the relief operations by the end of 1951.
From their side, the refugees wanted to increase the number of ration cards. They
found the rations given to them inadequate to meet their nutritional needs and started
using fake cards and cards of the deceased. More importantly, the refugees believed that
increasing the number of cards would mean political power when in relation to the Right
of Return, since there were serious attempts by Israel to debate the accuracy of the
number of refugees.
The first step for UNRWA was defining who was a Palestinian refugee. UNRWA
defined a refugee as:
A person who, as a result of the Palestine conflict, had lost his home and his means
of livelihood. In 1952, UNRWA the definition became more exclusive to become a
person whose normal residence had been Palestine for a minimum of two years
preceding the 1948 conflict and who as a result, had lost both his home and his
means of livelihood.
The two-year home residency guaranteed removing many refugees from the rolls.
The second step was more operational and involved carrying out a census with the
help of the Jordanian government between May, 1950 to June, 1951. The goal of the
census was threefold. The first was to distinguish refugees from non-refugees. The
second was to distinguish those who should be eligible for rations from those who could
support themselves. Third, classify the refugees according to their qualifications and
expertise in order to divide them into the different work projects planned (Buehrig 1971).
It does not seem that the government offered UNRWA anything more than its approval to
carry on the census. UNRWA had to hire more than 100 census takers and to fund the
whole operation.
The operation did not go as planned. Immediately after launching the census, refugees
started opposing the way it was carried out. In July, 1950 the General Committee for the
Bethlehem Refugees sent a letter to UNRWA protesting the operation:
There is no need to say that the system on which the census is built has failed to
show the truth and it is unfair for the refugees due to the way it is carried. Your
census taker has clear regulations that ask him to count whoever is at the shelter or
tent without former notice. If we apply this way in any other country of the world we
will see that only one third or half of the family members are in the house. Not to
mention that the refugees you are trying to count are coming from a disaster
(Filastin [Amman], 1 July, 1950).
The refugees had no doubt that the goal of the census operation was to reduce the
number of the refugees for political reasons. UNRWA tried to confirm to the refugees
that its intentions were apolitical. It also tried to convince them that the census operation
was for their advantage through reducing the number of ration recipients, which would
lead to increasing the size of the rations. UNRWA tried to communicate with the
refugees through meetings, conferences, and press releases. It also tried to convince the
Jordanian government and the refugees that continuing the census was a process that it
had to complete due to its affiliation with the General Assembly and its funding by
voluntary contributions from countries that cared about the integrity of the agency's
work. However, this line of reasoning did not hold much water for the suspicious
refugees.
In January, 1951, a number of refugees who had lost their cards because of the
rectification gathered in a coffee shop in a camp near Nablus. Two of the notables
attended the meeting, which concluded with a few recommendations: have a peaceful
demonstration towards the Government District Office to meet the officer, ask UNRWA
to have a representative from the refugees participate in the rectification process, ask
UNRWA to quickly look at the pending cases for revisions to recount into the records,
and form a delegation to meet the king and ask him to "protect them from the devils of
UNRWA."
In mid-1951, most census takers were fired on the premise that they were corrupt. A
new crew was hired, and UNRWA put a ceiling of 430,000 on the number of rations
beneficiaries. However, reporting newly born refugees was much faster than reporting the
deceased or those who became self-supporting.
Upon the request of the refugees, and with the support of the Jordanian government,
UNRWA created ad hoc committees to look at complains of refugees whose cards had
been cancelled. Each committee had three representatives from UNRWA's headquarters,
UNRWA's field office, and the government. The refugees refused the committees as they
were dominated by UNRWA representatives. They asked to have refugee notables,
landowners, and businessmen serving on the committees. They believed that there would
be a conflict of interest between serving on this committee and being UNRWA staff
member. They also believed that the census should be taken with the help of those who
knew the community best and were respected among its members. The refugees also
protested the fact that UNRWA named the census takers to look at the complaints. "You
can not be the judge and the enemy simultaneously," the Arabic proverb goes.
In 1952, a press release entitled: UNRWA Tries Formally to "Erase" the Refugees,
quoted in a skeptical way parts of the Director's annual report. in the report, unlike his
explanations to the refugees, the Director explicitly mentioned the need to remove the
refugees from the rolls:
The existence of vast numbers of able-bodied individuals who for four years have
looked to the United Nations for the provision of all their basic needs...is a social
and economic blight. The presence of refugees in host countries is more than the
measurable economic waste of manpower and of economic potential... the need for
aggressive steps to be taken to terminate relief operations is not only emphasized by
the psychologically debilitating effect of giving relief over long periods of time, with
the consequent development of a professional refugee mentality, but also by the
crushing economic burden--apart from the cost of the care of the individual, which
the presence of the refugees has placed upon the host countries.....They (The United
Nations, and in particular the contributing governments) have determined that in
the measure in which funds for the new programme are expended, funds for the
provision of relief will be reduced. The ultimate constructive task is to remove the
need for relief This is the objective of the new programme on which the Agency has
received afresh mandate (Filastin [Amman], 30, August, 1950).
The refugees made sure that they communicated strongly with the press. Six members
of the Jericho Refugee Committee visited the Filastin newspaper headquarters in Amman
to express their rejection of the new rectification and to condemn the injustice that the
first rectification had caused to the refugees. They also reiterated their doubts about
UNRWA's political aims. They emphasized that the refugees would boycott the
rectification and would not allow its takers to enter the camps. They asked the
government to support them in their final decision. Other committees brought a list of
refugees' signatures to support their demands: Should the agency insist on doing the
census, we would all give up our ration cards, boycott the agency, and announce this to
the General Assembly, the refugees threatened.
In 1953, the government forced the agency to stop the rectification due to the strong
resistance of the refugees. The Ministry of Social Services asked its representatives not to
attend the investigation committee meetings, and hence UNRWA would not be able to
cancel any ration card. The government also liquidated all the entities it had created for
this operation, including the investigation committee, appeal committees, and the High
Court for Refugees. The government was very cautious not to anger the refugees. As a
former government official explains:
Everybody dreaded their action: the government, UNRWA, and everybody else. And
I don't blame them. I am talking about the 50s, it (the exile) was fresh and everyone
remembered his house, furniture, grove and everything.
In 1954, after all the money and energy spent on the census operation in order to
reduce the number of refugees, the agency estimated around 70,000 duplicate cases in
Jordan but had no way to distinguish them. In four years, only 4,000 death cases had been
reported among the 490,000 refugees in Jordan. In 1955, the Director admitted that
"misunderstanding as to the true purposes of verification arose and have not yet been
completely overcome" (Buehrig 1971).
However, UNRWA started acting more sensitively. It reached an agreement with the
government and the refugees to keep the number of refugees the same, with the
possibility of adding 10,000 rations if needed. The concept was transferring the rations
from those who were not in need to these who were. Refugees were required to report the
names of eligible children born after 1948 and who were not on the rolls despite their
eligibility. The list had to be approved by the mukhtars. At the same time, refugees had to
report the names of their deceased. It was only when UNRWA was supported from
community leaders and when it put the refugees into competition among themselves that
the agency was successful in its rectification process.
However, the success was not long lasting. Finally, UNRWA admitted that it did not
have the apparatus to carry out the rectification process by itself. The director pointed out
in 1957 that "the Agency's system of control cannot be substantially improved without
the full support and technical cooperation of the refugee leaders and the host
governments".
The rectification failed for many reasons, and UNRWA was unable to comprehend its
complexity. Reasons included the symbolic value of the card, the distrust towards
UNRWA, the insufficiency of the distributed rations, the social implications of carrying
out the census, the sympathetic attitude of the census takers towards their fellow
refugees, and the corruption among many of them.
UNRWA did not understand the symbolic value that a ration card carried to the
refugee, who feared that losing their ration cards would indicate losing their refugee
status and consequently, jeopardize their Right of Return. The card was the only
documentation the refugees had to show their Palestinian origin:
The refugees have always paid a great a deal of attention and attachment to their
rations card not for the material value but for the symbolic value according to their
Right of Return through 194.
Moreover, it was humiliating for the refugees to have foreigners coming to their
shelters counting each family member now and then. As a former official of Palestinian
origin in the Jordanian government puts it:
We tried to help and take out the extra cards. But there are limits to how much
investigation you can make because this is humiliation. You can't make it every
night entering to the room like a secret police to see if one has five or seven kids.
This is impossible. It is humiliating. We would have become a police state....
For the older generation, the rectification reminded them of one that the British
Mandate did before the WWI, when many Palestinians were recruited into the army. As a
refugee puts it:
It was humiliation. They were coming each time and keep counting us. We knew
that they wanted to keep us busy faraway from our national cause by being
occupied by these small issues. They also reminded us of the British army coming to
our homes. Women were reluctant to tell the real number of their sons so they don't
lose them to the army.
At first, UNRWA did not put clear lines between the different categories of
registration and depended on the discretion of the census takers, who were themselves
refugees and often sympathized with their fellow needy refugees. Many census takers
believed that the rations given by UNRWA were insufficient. Consequently, they saw in
duplicate cards a legitimate way to have some extra food that was highly needed:
I was working on registration rolls. If I found a poor refugee with two rations
cards, one real and one duplicate, and realized his need for the food, I would
ignore his violation for the law. I had never done this for my family or village
members, but for those poor refugees. I had good intentions to serve them and I do
not see any problem with this. The rations were very small and could hardly suffice
for a few days. They had no other option.
Later, UNRWA adopted a scale for defining self-sufficiency later. The scale was
insufficient to determine the situation of many families with different scales of income
and family size. Upon the refugees' request, the government intervened later, and
UNRWA became unable to take the card of any refugee whose income was between JD7-
JD15 without consulting the Ministry of Refugees and Reconstruction.
The failure of the rectification process was one in a chain of events during the
turbulent relationship between the UNRWA and its clients.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION
I started this research by posing a few questions: What caused the shift in
UNRWA's mandate from economic development to human development? What was the
role of the refugees in creating this shift? And how could they pursue such a role? A
special focus for me was planning from the middle through refugees working with
UNRWA and simultaneously performing the role of the developer and that of the client.
I relied on historical records to show the diversity within the body of refugees, and
the assets they already possessed. I also relied on UN records to show that UNRWA was
created on the premise of dealing with the refugees as passive clients. The conflict
between the socio-political realities on the ground and the development approach was a
call for the refugees to get involved with an agency that would directly affect their daily
lives.
I suggested that the refugees had a vital role in proposing and implementing the
shift in UNRWA's mandate from economic development to human development. I
suggested that this was part of their resistance to reintegration projects and insistence on
their Right of Return. While economic development was viewed as a form of settlement
in the host nation-states, human development was viewed as a sustainable form of
development that individuals can carry on regardless of their final destination.
However, I made no claim that this was the only driving factor for the change in
UNRWA's mandate. Other factors that I did not explore include the expansion of the
educational system in Jordan and the rest of the Arab World during the years of study,
UNRWA's inability to get enough funding for economic development projects, and
technical difficulties relating to the implementation of the economic development
projects, especially when related to agriculture, infrastructure, paving the way for the new
development agency. These are all possible reasons for the change from economic
development to human development.
However, I provided empirical evidence that refugees had systematic and active
involvement in the decision-making process on many levels to the extent that this
involvement had caused a shift in UNRWA's mandate. I also concluded that their
involvement was not necessarily a spontaneous one but a planned process that they
gained through a political vision. This suggests that UNRWA was not an insulated, top-
down planner that acted upon the passive subjects. On the contrary, it suggests that the
barriers between UNRWA as a planner, and the refugees, as planned for, diminished with
time.
There were many circumstances that facilitated the creation of refugee planners.
These included consciousness and political participation, expertise in education, sharing a
common goal, local knowledge, and collective learning.
I looked at planners among UNRWA's local staff members of top administrative
seniors and street-level bureaucrats. Local staff members had the dual role of serving
their social and national affiliation from one hand and their institutional affiliation from
the other. They were mediators who were able to help the refugees make reasonable
requests and help the agency moderate its expectations. Local staff members realized
that individual behavior, when aggregated, can shape the mandate of an institution.
I also looked at refugees who did not work with UNRWA but have had an
imperative role in the planning process. I called those refugees community planners. In
order to achieve their goals, community planners adopted many strategies, including
spontaneous uprisings and strikes, forming local action groups, networking, and building
alliances. Community planners saw the symbolic value of strikes and appreciated them at
an early stage when bitterness was extreme and the journey of exile was still fresh. They
informally organized local action groups as a nucleus for wider movements. Examples
included the camp committees, volunteer teachers and principals. They had internal and
spontaneous networks that were voluntarily established with easy conditions of entry and
exit and minimal levels of individual or collective commitment and coordination. Their
networks had an imperative role in creating awareness among the refugees. Finally,
refugee planners built coalitions on different levels: local, national, regional, and
international. By selecting a case study about the census-taking process, I demonstrate
many of these points.
In this research I acknowledge social mobilization as an essential form of planning.
By doing so, I highlight an access to power that the masses have. Refugee planners were
able to reach transformative actions after criticizing the present conditions imposed on
them and proposing alternatives. A synergy between the socio-political mobilization and
institutional intervention was the driving factor for the planning process.
As mentioned earlier, there is an important point to emphasize. Both the developer
and the client in this case study represent a unique case. The Palestinian refugees were a
group of people empowered with human capital, political experience, and clear vision
about the future despite the absence of a political or elitist leadership. They differ from
other groups of clients or refugees. UNRWA is also a unique development agency due to
its operational and quasi-governmental mandate, sheer scale, institutional origins, and
funding resources, among many other peculiarities.
Epilogue:
This research highlights a bright spot in the dark history of the Palestinian refugees'
struggle despite all the displacement, destitution, and disappointment that they have been
facing. The research highlights a bright spot in the history of UNRWA despite the tense
environment in which it operates, which now includes budget cuts, military occupation in
the Occupied Territories, and most recently, the possible forced collapse of the
Palestinian Authority. I have to admit that the bright side of the story that I bring to light
did not last for long. UNRWA's educational facilities now are some of the most
overcrowded, least equipped, and most poorly financed. However, this research offers a
few insights to broaden our understanding of development.
First, I suggest that the refugees' participation in the planning process should be
considered a form of success despite all the difficulties it imposed on UNRWA.
UNRWA's institutional mandate does not acknowledge the democratic decision-making
process, local knowledge, or the human capital of the refugees. However, findings in this
research demonestarte that these elements had their imperative role in reshaping
UNRWA's institutional mandate.
Moreover, an agency's success or failure should be broadened to take into
consideration the long- and short-term interests of the agency as well as those of the
clients. From the original designers' point of view, UNRWA showed many symptoms of
failure. The first symptom was UNRWA's "continued existence" and its drastic
expansion. As opposed to the original plan, UNRWA did not cease to exist shortly after
its creation. On the contrary, the agency grew drastically to accommodate more than
26,000 staff posts and more than 4 million registered refugees. The second symptom of
failure was the fall of the large economic development and works projects that were
hoped to facilitate the refugees' integration in the host societies. However, the two
symptoms of failure from the original planners' point of view were indicators of success
from the refugees' point of view. They both affirmed the refugees' temporary status
rather than their inclusion in the host countries.
Second, institutional design plays a vital role in either facilitating participation or
blocking it. Had top administrative local staff or street-level bureaucrats not been
refugees themselves, the process would have been different. The same could be said if
other variables changed, including the number of local staff members, the discretion
given to them, and the design of their jobs.
Third, I suggest that special arrangements, such as education, social status, political
power, or wealth, are not necessarily essential to allow for a client's participation in the
development process. This case study examines participation in one of the most
unfavorable conditions in the world: a status of exile, poverty, hunger, and absence of
nation-state and political representation. If participation could work under harsh
conditions, the model should be applicable to a wider spectrum of situations and
audiences, including the less privileged, the exiled, and the illiterate.
Fourth, this case study is an example for the involvement of clients during the
design as well as the implementation of the project. Clients' involvement is important for
many reasons. It adds the local knowledge of the client rather than solely the distant one
of the expert. Cultural practices and beliefs which may not be recognized in the
vocabulary of modernization have been proven as efficient as professional norms. Both
of these paradigms should be related in a balanced way rather than in an hierarchical,
exclusive either-or fashion (Apffel-Marglin 1990). One duty of the developer is to
facilitate the input of the client rather than to exclude it. In addition, involvement of the
clients increases the accountability of a development institution.
Fifth, moral values and political stands do not have to be abandoned in order to
achieve every day necessities in a challenging situation. Both ends should not be looked
upon as mutually exclusive. Rather, they are complimentary. Refugee participation in the
development process was based on moral values as well as tangible needs of daily life
that varied widely, from a need for food to a need for physical infrastructure.
Finally, UNRWA had unintended planning outcomes. This is best exemplified
through its educational system, which trained thousands of well-educated professionals
who worked in the Gulf countries, Jordan, and the West.
Future Research:
There are many ideas for follow-up research that come out of this study.
There is a need to examine other variables that might have influenced the refugees'
participation, including spatial concentrations, policies adopted by different host
countries, political representation, and the emergence of Palestinian political parties. This
research has not touched upon the divide between refugees who live in the camps and
those who do not. Relating the findings of this study to a certain spatial context will allow
us to build a correlation between the level and the form of activism on one side and the
spatial concentrations of refugees on the other.
This research has looked upon refugees in Jordan, which is the only host country
that awarded the refugees citizenship. Comparing those refugees with others in Lebanon
or Syria may help us understand the role of nation-states in encouraging or discouraging
activism among the refugees.
By the same token, there is a need to put this research in a wider context by relating
refugees' participation to possible long-term consequences such as the emergence of
Palestinian political parties (e.g. Fatah) or civil society in Jordan or the preservation of
the Palestinian identity distinct from the Jordanian one. This would necessitate extending
the time of the research until the 1960s when Fatah, among many other political parties,
was formally established and recognized.
APPENDICES
a) UNRWA organization: 1950 (Source: Schiff 1995)
b) Growth in education: teachers and training places in the four host countries9
(1950-1960)
Vocational
Year Elementary Preparatory Schools Teachers Training
1950 41,053 NA 64 800 0
1955 98,427 6,242 264 2,670 303
1960 103,632 19,639 382 3,494 805
Source: Schiff, 1995
c) Major contributors to UNRWA: 1950-1969
% of
Contributor Contribution total
USA 456 68.10%
UK 110 16.3
Canada 24 3.6
France 16 2.3
Sweden 11 1.7
Source: Schiff, 1995
9 Separate data about Jordan are not available.
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